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ABSTRACT 
 
Section 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 encompasses the right of an accused to 
be discharged from the offence he has allegedly committed where, at the close of the State’s 
case, there is no evidence on which the court may draw the accused to the charge.  
  
The section and its forerunners have dwelled in South African law for some time. In the first 
instance, the discharge provision was used as an instrument to prevent the jury from reaching 
perverse decisions. Nevertheless, despite the abolition of the jury system of adjudication in 
South Africa in 1969, there is no doubt that the section ensures that the accused’s fair trial 
rights are fulfilled. 
 
However, though discharge may seem like a straightforward task for a judge who, at the close 
of the State’s case, has a sense of the strength of the allegations against the accused, it is far 
from this. Over the years, South African courts and scholars have grappled with the 
interpretation of the section, more especially with the words ‘no evidence’. Furthermore, there 
have been countless debates on the standard of evidence and the role ‘credibility’ should play 
at the discharge stage of the proceedings. As a result, there is evidence, fairly recently from the 
outcome in S v Dewani [2014] JOL 32655 (WCC), which suggests that courts do not fully 
understand and appreciate the extent of their role in deciding to discharge an accused. 
 
Thus, the aim of this dissertation is to critically analyse s 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
51 of 1977 in respect of its interpretation, its history and its operation in another jurisdiction, 
and produce a meaningful interpretation which would restore purpose to the section in South 
Africa. Furthermore, the case of S v Dewani will be thoroughly analysed as it is a recent 
application of s 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and overview of s 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
 
In 1996, after an era of political movements and severe human rights breaches, South Africa 
formulated a world-class Constitution1 second to none. Due to South Africa’s rich history, the 
rights enshrined in our Constitution are paramount. The Constitution was formulated to 
accommodate the needs of every category of person in South Africa, including persons accused 
of committing crimes. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and hence all legislation 
must be articulated in accordance with it.2 
 
Section 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act,3 in a nutshell, is the discharge provision present in 
South African law that is available to an accused person. The section reads as follows:  
‘if, at the close of the case for the prosecution at any trial, the court is of the opinion that there 
is no evidence that the accused committed the offence referred to in the charge or any offence 
of which he may be convicted on the charge, it may return a verdict of not guilty’. 
 
In summary, if the accused feels that the State has not produced a sufficient case, on which he 
or she may be found guilty of the alleged crime, then the accused can apply to court, in terms 
of s 174 of the Act, to be discharged from the charge against him.4 
 
It has been established that the words ‘no evidence’ is not interpreted to mean absolutely no 
evidence, but rather, ‘no evidence upon which a reasonable man, acting carefully, might 
convict’.5 
                                                          
1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (hereafter referred to as ‘the Constitution’).  
2 Section 2 of the Constitution. 
3 Section 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (here after referred to as ‘the Act’). 
4 S v Heller (2) 1964 1 SA 524 (W). 
5 S v Dewani [2014] JOL 32655 (WCC) para 7; R v Shein 1925 AD 6; R v Herholdt & Others 1956(2) SA 722 
(W); S v Mpetha & Others 1983(4) SA 262; S v Shuping & others 1983(2) SA 119 (B); S v Lubaxa 2001(2) 
SACR 703 (SCA). 
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Over the years it has become evident that the courts, as well as many legal writers have grappled 
with the interpretation and constitutionality of s 174 of the Act.6 They have identified multiple 
shortcomings inherent in the way some courts have interpreted the section.7 
 
The controversy surrounding s 174 of the Act arises primarily as a result of the insertion of the 
word ‘may’ in the section. This word inevitably leaves it to the court to exercise its discretion 
on whether or not to discharge the accused person.8 Furthermore, the State becomes 
disadvantaged as a decision in terms of s 174 of the Act is not questionable on appeal.9 
However, where a court refuses to discharge an accused at the close of the State’s case, then 
such a decision may be reviewable only where there is evidence of an irregularity in the course 
of the trial.10 
 
In S v Agliotti11 the court emphasised that s 174 of the Act empowers the court to judicially 
exercise its discretion to decide on discharging the accused at the close of the State’s case, and 
it would be incorrect to give recommendations to the court on how to exercise such a discretion.  
 
The court in Agliotti went on to say, ‘where more than one accused are charged with the same 
offence, the court may refuse to discharge one of them if it is in the interests of justice not to 
do so’.12 
 
One of the key cases dealing with an interpretation of s 174 of the Act, and one which sparked 
much controversy, is S v Shuping & others13. In this case Hiemstra CJ attempted to formulate 
a two stage enquiry to serve as a guideline for courts when exercising their discretion on 
whether or not to confirm or reject an application for discharge.14 According to Shuping, the 
first leg of the enquiry is ‘whether there is enough evidence on which a reasonable man might 
convict on’. If the answer to this question is ‘no’ then the court deciding the application must 
                                                          
6 G Gertsch ‘Forensic Hara-kiri: The Dilemma of Discharge at the Close of the State’s Case’ (1993) 6 (3) South 
African Journal of Criminal Justice 272. 
7 Ibid. 
8 R v Mkize & others 1960 (1) SA 276 (N); S v Mall & others (1) 1960 (2) SA 340 (N) at 342. 
9 See R v Lakatula & Others 1919 AD 362; R v Afrika 1938 AD 566. 
10 Ebrahim v Minister of Justice 2000 (2) SACR 173 (W). 
11 S v Agliotti 2011 (2) SACR 437 (GSJ) at 257. 
12 Ibid at 258. 
13 Shuping supra (note 5 above). 
14 A Skeen ‘The Decision to Discharge an Accused at the Conclusion of the State Case: A Critical Analysis’ 
(1985) 102 (2) South African Law Journal 290. 
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move on to the second enquiry, ‘is there a reasonable possibility that the defence case might 
supplement the prosecution’s case?’15 
 
The inclusion of the word ‘may’ as well as the enquiry formulated in the Shuping case creates 
the notion that the courts have an absolute discretion in deciding to discharge an accused, even 
where the state has produced no compelling evidence against the accused.16 Accordingly, the 
enquiry laid out in the Shuping case was soon criticized.17 
 
The criticism was based on the notion that South African criminal law is founded principally 
on the Latin maxim ‘he who alleges must prove’.18 Therefore, there rests a duty on the State, 
as the alleger, to present satisfactory evidence to prove that the accused is guilty beyond 
reasonable doubt.19  
 
Thus, the rejection of the enquiry in the Shuping case was consequently grounded solely on the 
second leg of the test.20 The State as the alleger needs to tender convincing evidence which 
could draw the accused to the commission of the crime, if it does not, the court cannot expect 
the defence’s case to strengthen the State’s case.21 
 
In the case of S v Phuravhatha & others,22 du Toit AJ held, in the event of a reasonable 
possibility of the State’s case being supplemented by the defence’s case, this reason alone 
should entail an application for discharge being rejected. Such a situation is one of the factors 
that should be considered by the judge in deciding to discharge the accused. 
 
Every accused person has the right to a fair trial as envisaged in s 35(3) of the Constitution and 
the second leg of the enquiry in the Shuping case breaches this right.23 Therefore, where the 
                                                          
15 Shuping supra (note 5 above) at 120 – 122 A. 
16 R v Kritzinger 1952 (2) SA 402 (W). 
17 See S v Phuravhatha & others 1992 (2) SACR 544 (V) at 551-2; S v Qozo 1994 (1) BCLR 10 (Ck); S v 
Beckett 1987 (4) SA 8 (C); S v Amerika 1990 (2) SACR 480 (C); S v Heller (2) 1964 (1) SA 524 (W). See also R 
v Louw 1918 AD 344; R v Thielke 1918 AD 373; R v Machinini (2) 1944 WLD 91. 
18 J Van de Berg Bail a Practitioner’s Guide 3 ed (2012) 167. 
19 S v Mathebula 1997 (1) BCLR 123 (W). 
20 Phuravhatha supra (note 17 above). 
21 S Mbonani ‘Discharge of the accused at the end of the prosecution case: a new direction?’ (1999) 32 (2) De 
Jure 240. 
22 Phuravhatha supra (note 17 above). 
23 Mbonani op cit (note 21 above) 244; Mathebula supra (note 19 above). 
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State presents no compelling evidence, and the court subsequently refuses a discharge 
application by the accused, the accused’s right to a fair trial is breached.24 
 
The accused also has a right to be presumed innocent until found guilty.25 Therefore, if a court 
rejects a discharge application believing that the State’s case will be aided in some way by the 
defence’s case then this will be prejudicial and a breach of the accused’s right to be presumed 
innocent.26 The State has the onus of proving the accused’s guilt. As a result, by rejecting an 
application for discharge, where the State has failed to discharge the onus placed on it, the 
accused is then placed in a position to prove that he is innocent, which makes the right to be 
presumed innocent futile.27 
 
Part of the right to a fair trial also includes that an accused is not to be compelled to give self-
incriminating evidence.28 In S v Lubaxa29 it was stated that if, on the State’s evidence, the only 
way the accused would be found guilty and convicted is if he incriminates himself during cross-
examination then, under such circumstances, if the court fails to discharge the accused the court 
will be breaching his Constitutional rights.  
 
However, where the state is unsuccessful in establishing a case against the accused because it 
has failed to prove a necessary element of the offence due to an inexperienced prosecutor, then 
such a failure can be corrected by the judge recalling a witness and asking him a single 
question.30 If the court omits to do this and discharges the accused, this would amount to an 
improper exercise of judicial discretion.31 Skeen further argues that: 
‘…it is an improper exercise of a judicial discretion to put an accused on his defence where a 
prima facie case has not been established’.32    
 
                                                          
24 Gertsch reasons that if the State presents an insufficient case, and then the court subsequently refuses a 
discharge application, to the detriment of the accused, then the accused is left with two options that could 
potentially breach his right to a fair trial: if the accused closes their case without tendering any evidence then the 
accused’s silence could be held contrary to him, as it may warrant a conviction against the accused. Secondly, if 
the accused decides to testify, then he or his witnesses may reluctantly provide information during cross - 
examination to the detriment of his case. 
25 Section 35(3)(h) of the Constitution. See Gertsch op cit (note 6 above) 273. 
26 A Skeen ‘A Bill of Rights and the Presumption of Innocence’ (1993) 9 SAJHR 525, 535. 
27 Gertsch op cit (note 6 above) 275. 
28 Section 35(3)(j) of the Constitution. 
29 Lubaxa supra (note 5 above) para18. 
30 S v Van den Berg 1995 (4) BCLR 479 (Nm). 
31 Ibid. 
32 Skeen op cit (note 14 above) 287. 
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Amidst the commotion is the issue of whether the credibility of State’s witnesses should be 
taken into consideration by the judge at the stage of deciding a discharge. In the case of R v 
Dladla & others33 and S v National Board of Executors Ltd34 it was stated that the court should 
not concern itself with credibility when considering a discharge. Conversely, in S v Mpetha & 
others35 the court held that credibility should play only a ‘limited role’, and the State’s evidence 
could be ‘ignored if it is of such poor quality that no reasonable person could possibly accept 
it’.36 This has appeared to be the more favourable view.37 
 
Therefore, to sum up the legal position concisely, in the case of S v Ndlangamandla & 
another,38 Willis J stated, that the right to be presumed innocent, the right to silence and the 
complementary right not to testify has three practical significances that impact s 174 of the Act, 
these include: 
1) ‘The court has a duty mero motu to raise the issue of the possibility of a discharge at the close 
of the State case if it appears to the court that there may be no evidence that the accused 
committed the offence; 
2) Credibility, where it is of such poor quality that no reasonable person could possibly accept the 
evidence, should be taken into account at this stage; 
3) The second leg of the test promulgated in S v Shuping, namely, that even if there is no evidence 
at the close of the prosecution case upon which a reasonable man may convict, a discharge 
should nonetheless be refused if there is a reasonable possibility that the defence evidence 
may supplement the State’s case, should not apply’.39  
 
Whilst South Africa indeed has an exceptional Constitution and superlative legislation guiding 
our judiciary to reach the best possible judgements, the confidence in our justice system is ever 
deteriorating. Time and time again South African citizens seem to feel that justice is not served.  
 
A couple of years ago these feelings towards the South African justice system were revived 
after the judgement in the case of S v Dewani.40 In this case, the court approved an application 
for discharge by the accused in complete disregard of the evidence presented by the State’s 
                                                          
33 R v Dladla & others (2) 1961 (3) SA 921 (D). 
34 S v National Board of Executors Ltd & others 1971 (3) SA 817 (D) at 819. 
35 Mpetha supra (note 5 above) at 265D-G. 
36 Ibid at 265D-G. 
37 S v Swartz & another 2001 (1) SACR 334 (W). 
38 S v Ndlangamandla & another 1999 (1) SACR 391 (W). 
39 E Du Toit … et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 2 ed (1987) 126. 
40 Dewani supra (note 5 above). 
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witnesses as such evidence was regarded as ‘inconsistent’, ‘riddled with contradictions’, and 
therefore, not credible.41 
 
Section 174 of the Act becomes detrimental to the interests of justice where the prosecution 
presents a weak case. This is exactly what occurred in the case of S v Dewani. The Dewani 
case thus forms the basis for the criticism of s 174 of the Act and will be discussed in great 
detail in this dissertation. 
 
Another prominent feature of s 174 of the Act is that, from an historical perspective of the 
section, the discharge provision was incorporated into South African law from English law 
when South Africa operated under the jury system of law.42 Hoffmann and Zeffertt point out 
that s 174 of the Act ‘owes its existence to rules which evolved in England to control juries, 
thus preventing them from reaching perverse verdicts’.43 It is interesting that the provision still 
exists far beyond the abolishment of the jury system in South Africa.44  
 
It becomes apparent that s 174 of the Act is definitely open to misapplication by our courts as 
a result of their unfettered discretion. The question that can be posed in this regard is does the 
accused’s right to a fair trial outweigh the interests of justice? 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
 
With the above noted it becomes crucial to give prominence to the concerns with s 174 of the 
Act. Courts are given an unlimited discretion on whether or not to discharge the accused. Thus, 
the section if implemented incorrectly may lead to pertinacious decisions by South African 
courts. This was made very clear in the Dewani case. 
 
Furthermore, when we look to the origins of the section we see that a discharge provision was 
merely inserted in South African law to control a panel of lay persons, the jury, to reach rational 
and correct decisions. The issue that then arises is, is there still a need for a discharge provision 
                                                          
41 Ibid para 23.1.45. 
42 L H Hoffmann & D T Zeffertt The South African Law' of Evidence 3 ed (1981) 392. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Gertsch op cit (note 6 above) 276 – 282. 
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in our law since South Africa has done away with the jury system of law? This question forms 
a big part of the research and will be answered in this dissertation. 
 
1.3 Statement of purpose 
 
The purpose of this study is therefore to illuminate the various issues surrounding the 
interpretation of s 174 of the Act and assess its current relevance in South African law, 
especially in light of the decision in S v Dewani. 
 
1.4 Rationale  
 
The arguments surrounding s 174 of the Act are quite scant, at times unclear and lacking in 
certain aspects, hence, leaving future writers on the topic uncertain of their position in the 
argument. Therefore, the objectives for undertaking this study is to eradicate the flaws innate 
in s 174 of the Act and recommend a purposeful interpretation of the section.  
 
Furthermore, due to the fact that the Dewani case is such a recent judgement, that implements 
s 174 of the Act in such a controversial manner, not many legal writers have had the opportunity 
to scrutinise the section from the point of view of the court in that case.  
 
1.5 Research questions 
 
This study aims to enquire whether s 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 should 
remain in South African law despite its various controversies. In order to reach such a 
conclusion, certain key questions need to be answered: 
 
i. Why was there a need for a discharge provision in South African law, ultimately leading 
to the enactment of s 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977?  
 
ii. How is ‘discharge’ dealt with in another jurisdiction?  
 
iii. Looking at the case of S v Dewani, how is s 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
1977 currently being implemented in South Africa?  
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iv. Taking into account all surrounding factors and the abovementioned questions, is s 174 
of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 still a necessary provision in South African 
law?  
 
1.6 Research methodology 
 
This study will comprise of a thorough desk-top literature study, using primary and secondary 
sources of data. The researcher bases the study principally on an analysis of s 174 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Hence, the study will refer to case law, textbooks, journal 
articles and reliable internet sources that analyse, comment and criticise s 174 of the Act. 
 
The primary case that the study will focus on is the Dewani case, a recent controversial case 
wherein s 174 of the Act was implemented. 
 
Furthermore, this study will make use of comparative law, by comparing the South African 
law on discharge of an accused to similar legal provisions in another jurisdiction, that being 
the law on discharge of an accused in Canada.  
 
Using this methodology, the researcher aims to evaluate section 174 of the Act and assess if 
such a discharge provision is essential in South Africa or if it should be discarded or amended 
to facilitate an improved justice system in South Africa. 
 
1.7 Structure of the dissertation 
 
This dissertation will consist of five chapters and will be set out as follows: 
 
Chapter One: Introduction. This chapter will give the reader a detailed insight into the 
background of the research undertaken, the rationale on why the researcher decided to conduct 
such research and will provide a guideline on the questions that are going to be answered to 
enable the researcher to reach a final conclusion. This chapter also sets out the research 
methodology that will be undertaken. 
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Chapter Two: History of the discharge provision in South African law. This chapter aims to 
track the origins of the discharge provision in South African law and trace how such a provision 
has developed in our law. Basically the chapter aims to identify the need for such a provision 
in South African law in the first instance. 
 
Chapter Three: Section 548(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code: Discharge after a preliminary 
inquiry. The purpose of this chapter is to look at another jurisdiction and its laws on discharge 
and compare it to s 174 of the Act. This chapter is also necessary in identifying any short-
comings that might be present in South African law. 
 
Chapter Four: A recent application of s 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977: S v 
Dewani. Looking at the Dewani case, this chapter intends to expose how the courts have been 
applying the discharge provision, as well as the errors inherent in such application. This chapter 
will accentuate how such a provision is so easily susceptible to misuse by the judiciary. 
 
Chapter Five: Conclusion: Assessing the current relevance of s 174 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act 51 of 1977. The final chapter will evaluate the above four chapters and conclude whether 
or not the discharge provision is indispensable or whether the section is in need of an 
amendment in order to remove its weaknesses. If it is established that the section is still 
relevant, recommendations will be made on ways in which the section should be interpreted so 
as to ensure consistency in its application. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HISTORY OF THE DISCHARGE PROVISION IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The purpose of s 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 is to ensure that an accused 
person does not have to answer, and thereby put up a defence, to a case where the prosecution 
has not laid out sufficient evidence to establish the accused may be guilty of the alleged crime.   
 
In order to understand the operation of this provision to the fullest extent, one needs to enquire 
as to why a discharge procedure was necessary in the first place, and what its initial purpose 
was. Locating the origins of s 174 of the Act is also pivotal to assessing its current relevance 
in South African law. 
 
Section 174 of the Act is not a new provision in South African law and in fact was a feature of 
all previous iterations of the Criminal Procedure Act. In 1917, a discharge provision was 
introduced to South African law from nineteenth century English law where it took the form 
of s 221(3) of Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of 1917.45 Even when the Criminal 
Procedure Act 56 of 1955 was enacted, the same procedure found its place under s 157(3). The 
court in S v Lubaxa46 further held: 
‘Section 174 of the Act repeats in all material respects the terms of its predecessors in the 1917 
and 1955 Criminal Codes’.47 
 
Looking at the lifespan of s 174 of the Act, one can only infer that such a provision must have 
a solid foundation in South African law to be in existence despite the various amendments to 
the Criminal Procedure Act. 
 
As will be seen in this chapter, s 174 of the Act operates on principles and procedures that are 
shared with common law adversary trials. Furthermore, the section was inserted into South 
African law in order to ensure that juries were able to reach the fairest decisions. Accordingly, 
                                                          
45 R v Smith 1912 AD 386. 
46 Lubaxa supra (note 5 above) 
47 Ibid para 10. 
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this raises the question of why such a procedure is so dear to South African Criminal law 
regardless of the shift taken by the South African legal system in 1969 with the abolishment of 
the jury system of adjudication?48 
 
Before entering into any debate on the current relevance of s 174 of the Act, one needs to gain 
insight into the origin and background of the section in order to reveal its underlying purpose. 
This chapter will thus begin by looking at the nature of the adversarial criminal justice system 
and how its principles are entrenched in s 174 of the Act. Secondly, this chapter will focus on 
how the discharge procedure arose with the advent of juries, and lastly, it will look at the 
discharge provision in South Africa after the abolition of the jury. 
 
2.2 Discharge and the adversarial criminal justice system 
 
The ‘procedural pause’ in the litigation to assess the evidence, as envisaged by s 174 of the 
Act, forms part of both ‘civil and criminal litigation in the Anglo – American legal systems’, 
from which South Africa predominantly derives its procedure.49 The essential question to be 
answered is how has this procedure, a break in the trial to assess the quality of evidence, come 
about? Aside from the argument that it would be a ‘waste of time’ as well as the court’s 
resources to proceed with a clearly ‘hopeless’ matter,50 this procedure emerges from a ‘deeper 
structural basis’.51  
 
As mentioned above, the discharge provision originates as a result of a number of principles 
and procedures demanded by common law adversarial trials.52 The common features that form 
part of the common law adversarial trial as well as s 174 of the Act include: first, the fact that 
the prosecution is required to open with their case at the beginning of the trial.53 In common 
law countries the accused has the privilege of viewing how the prosecution presents its case 
before deciding whether or not to tender evidence in rebuttal.54  
 
                                                          
48 The jury system was abolished in South Africa by the Abolition of Juries Act 34 of 1969. 
49 TW Phillips 'The motion for acquittal a neglected safeguard' (1961) 70 Yale LJ 1150; R Steffen 'The prima 
facie case in non-jury trials' (1959) 27 U Chi LR 94. 
50 G Williams 'The application for a directed verdict' (1965) Criminal LR 346. 
51 Gertsch op cit (note 6 above) 274. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Hoffmann & Zeffertt op cit (note 42 above) 502. Also, Skeen op cit (note 14 above) 286. 
54 G Williams The Proof of Guilt: A Study of the English Criminal Trial 3 ed (1963) 82. 
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Second, is the accused’s right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.55 Because this right 
forms the basis from which criminal proceedings operate, it can be argued that such a 
presumption of innocence can only be invalidated by the presentation of substantial and 
compelling evidence by the prosecution.56 Furthermore, the standard of proof in a criminal 
trial, being ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’,57 compels the State to present an evidentially 
solid case to overturn the right to be presumed innocent that the accused possesses.  
 
The third feature of the adversarial legal system from which s 174 originates is the accused’s 
right to remain silent58 and the right against the provision of self-incriminating evidence.59 
Hence, once again, in order to uphold the accused’s fair trial rights, the prosecution will have 
to adduce convincing evidence before the accused presents his case.  
 
The last element that s 174 of the Act draws from the adversarial system of law is the ‘general 
burden of proof’ that rests on the prosecution, as the alleger of the crime, ‘to prove its case 
without the assistance of the accused’.60 In order to emphasise the above point it is useful to 
note a comment by Warren CJ in the case of Miranda v Arizona: 
‘...our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an 
individual produce the evidence against him by its own independent labours, rather than by the 
cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth'.61 
 
From the above discussion of the features of the adversarial trial system, which is the system 
followed in South Africa, it can be gathered that this trial system favours the notion of a pause 
in the trial to assess the evidence presented by the prosecution.62 This process serves as a 
mechanism to dismiss a matter where, on the evidence provided by the prosecution, there are 
no reasonable prospects of the accused being convicted of the alleged offence. The procedure 
for achieving this has been termed: 
                                                          
55 Section 35(3)(h) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
56 R v Britz 1949 (3) SA 293 (A) at 302. 
57 J Grant ‘South African Criminal Law’ (2014) available at https://sacriminallaw.net/tag/proof-beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt/, accessed on 17 July 2017. 
58 Section 35(3)(h) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
59 Section 35(3)(j) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996.  
60 Gertsch op cit (note 6 above) 275. 
61 Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436 (1965) at 460. 
62 Gertsch op cit (note 6 above) 275. 
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‘an essential adversary hurdle within the common law trial. The hurdle exists because ... it is 
unfair to ask an opponent to answer a charge or claim where the evidence tendered by the 
proponent is incapable (however generously looked at) of making out that charge or claim’.63 
 
From the principles of the ‘adversary hurdle’ arises the accused’s right to be discharged, or 
otherwise his right to expect the court to test the ‘sufficiency of the evidence’ presented by the 
prosecution before he commences with his case.64 
 
2.3 The history of the jury trial 
 
A discharge provision was inserted into South African law directly from English law purely as 
a mechanism to guide the jury. However, although the jury system of adjudication is now 
abolished in South Africa, trial by jury is worthy of mention when engaging in any discussion 
on the origins of s 174 of the Act. 
 
The jury system of adjudication65 emerged in England and was imposed on its colonies around 
the 18th century and thereafter.66 The emergence of the jury was primarily a result of mistrust 
in the judiciary in protecting the rights of the accused.67 Hence, in essence, the jury was created 
as an instrument for protecting the accused against any ‘unjustified convictions by a corrupt or 
executive-minded judiciary’.68 Thus, the jury ensured that government’s power, in the form of 
a judiciary, was controlled rather than subject to abuse.69 
 
                                                          
63 Williams op cit (note 54 above) 345. 
64 Gertsch op cit (note 6 above) 275. 
65 ‘The history of the jury’: ‘The historical roots of the jury date to the eighth century A.D. Long before 
becoming an impartial body, during the reign of Charlemagne, juries interrogated prisoners. In the twelfth 
century, the Normans brought the jury to England, where its accusatory function remained: Citizens acting as 
jurors were required to come forward as witnesses and to give evidence before the monarch's judges. Not until 
the fourteenth century did jurors cease to be witnesses and begin to assume their modern role as triers of fact. 
This role was well established in British common law when settlers brought the tradition to America, and after 
the United States declared its independence, all state constitutions guaranteed the right of jury trial in criminal 
cases’, available at http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/jury, accessed on 31 July 2017. 
66 P Devlin Trial by Jury 3 ed (1966) 5-14; VP Hans & N Vidmar Judging the Jury (1986) 21-44; EG 
Henderson 'The background of the seventh amendment' (1966) 80 Harvard LR 289-335. 
67 Gertsch op cit (note 6 above) 276. 
68 Ibid. 
69AW Alschuler 'The changing role of the jury in the nineteenth century' in EH Monkkonen (Ed.) Crime and 
Justice in American History - Historical Articles on the Origins and Evolution of American Criminal Justice, 
vol 2: Courts and Criminal Procedure (1991) 46. 
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The jury comprised of a group of lay persons who were given the authority to decide on certain 
aspects of a legal case that came before them, and to return a verdict.70 
 
When the jury was introduced the court essentially became a ‘split tribunal’,71 as the jury would 
determine questions of fact and the bench would determine questions of law.72 Consequently, 
the judges were unable to determine questions of fact, and likewise, the jury was unable to 
decide on questions of law.73 In this regard, ‘questions of fact included the weighing up of the 
evidence, as well as making decisions based upon its credibility’.74 By contrast, questions of 
law included ‘relevance and admissibility of the evidence’.75 
 
Due to the split tribunal determining different aspects of the trial, it was inevitable that when 
the distinction between law and fact was uncertain, ‘tension’ arose between the jury and the 
judiciary.76 
 
However, another dilemma also arose. If the jury was blessed with the right to decide on the 
facts of the case then this would mean, according to Gertsch: 
‘…it had the power to convict, preferably on the evidence, but also, perversely, against the 
evidence’.77 
 
As a result, in essence the accused could possibly be jeopardised by the very system employed 
to uphold his rights.  
 
There was therefore a need to control the jury’s power to ‘convict’.78 This need was fulfilled 
by the implementation of a ‘procedural device’ by the judiciary, which was meant to evade the 
                                                          
70 E Kahn ‘Restore the jury or reform?’ (1991) 108 SALJ 687, ‘Reform? Aren't things bad enough already?’ 
(1992) 109 SALJ 87: in terms of s 174 of the Act the court could return a 'verdict' of not guilty, this is the 
manner in which the jury decided upon the fact of a case before it. The jury would not deliver a reasoned 
judgment but, rather, would simply express it by pronouncing the accused guilty or not guilty. Such a 
declaration was the ‘verdict’ of the jury. 
71 Gertsch op cit (note 6 above) 276. 
72 ‘Role of the Jury’ available at www.citizensinformation.ie/en/justice/courtroom/jury.html, accessed on 31 
July 2017. 
73 The maxim for this is: 'ad quaestionem facti non respondent iudices, ita ad quaestionem iuns non respondent 
iurat'. This maxium basically means that the judges will not decide questions of fact and the jury will not decide 
questions of law. 
74 Gertsch op cit (note 6 above) 277. 
75 Ibid. See also Hal Tua Tau v PP [1981] 3 All ER 14 at 19g. 
76 Gertsch op cit (note 6 above) 277. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
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jury in totality, and took the form of the ‘submission of no case to answer’.79 In light of this 
procedural device judges were entitled to remove a matter from the jury, either when the 
prosecution had tendered all evidence or when all the witnesses had testified, in the belief that 
the evidence adduced against the accused was unsubstantial or inadequate to return a verdict 
of guilty.80 ‘A perverse verdict, and a miscarriage of justice, would thereby be prevented’.81 
 
However, the emergence of such a procedural device to bypass the jury did not come with ease 
and faced certain issues. These issues included what threshold of evidence needed to be 
presented by the prosecution in order for such evidence to be rendered sufficient to convict the 
accused, and, how that threshold would influence the role the judge and jury plays in deciding 
on the matter.82 
 
In responding to the abovementioned issue on what constitutes sufficient evidence to convict, 
a distinction needs to be drawn between the quantum of evidence (sufficiency) and its quality 
(the weight and credibility of the evidence).83 It must be emphasised that quantum and quality 
are not one and the same. From this distinction arises a quantitative and qualitative analysis of 
evidence.84 
 
Judges were required to do a quantitative analysis of the evidence which entailed checking if 
there was at least some evidence that could establish each of the elements of the charge.85 On 
the other hand, the jury was entrusted with the qualitative analysis of the evidence which 
required them to analyse the credibility of the evidence and see how effective it is in 
establishing the material facts of the case at hand.86 
 
A quantitative and qualitative analysis of evidence is essential when determining what evidence 
is ‘sufficient’ as it creates boundaries for the judge and jury to act respectively.87 The judge 
could rule on the matter and still ensure respect for the jury’s function if ‘sufficiency’ of 
evidence were interpreted in a quantitative manner, that is, is there some evidence that pertains 
                                                          
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 R v Galbraith [1981] 2 All ER 1060 at 1062f-g; R Cross & C Tapper Cross on Evidence 7 ed (1990) 173. 
84 Gertsch op cit (note 6 above) 277. 
85 Ibid 277 - 278. 
86 Ibid 278. 
87 Ibid. 
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to each element of the charge.88 Alternatively, if the interpretation of ‘sufficiency’ were to 
include also an assessment of the quality of the prosecution’s evidence, which would include 
looking at the weight the evidence would carry as well as how credible it will be, then this 
would mean that the judge would then be intruding into the jury’s ‘terrain’.89 
 
Therefore the judge, in doing a quantitative analysis, would determine if the evidence was 
sufficient to sustain a conviction, thereafter, the jury would do a qualitative analysis and 
determine the weight and credibility of the evidence.90 Consequently, if the judge found that 
the evidence was insufficient then he or she would submit that the accused had ‘no case to 
answer’.91 What essentially flows from this is that the evidence would not reach the jury stage 
whenever the judge submitted that the accused had no case to answer, and therefore the jury 
would be bypassed.92  
 
Another reply to the aforementioned issue is that the matter should be immediately handed 
over to the jury if there was a ‘scintilla of evidence’ against the accused, that is, even if there 
was a jot of evidence to show the accused is guilty.93 This was substantially a low standard of 
evidence to convict. Nevertheless, in the English case of Metropolitan Railway Co. v Jackson94 
the court dealt with this issue and held: 
‘whereas formerly it had been the practice for a Judge to direct that a case should go to the jury 
when there was a mere scintilla of evidence, nowadays the practice was that there should be 
evidence before the Court upon which a reasonable man might fairly convict; and that has 
always been understood to have been the law in this country’. 
 
However, while the scintilla requirement had the effect of eliminating the jurisdictional dispute 
between the jury and judiciary, it did not deal with the foundational objective of preventing the 
jury from making perverse decisions.95 Such a theory also failed to acknowledge the discharge 
                                                          
88 Ibid. 
89 Alschuler op cit (note 69 above) 49. See also R v Thielke 1918 AD 373 at 379: ‘The general principle is that 
the weight to be attached to evidence duly admitted is a matter for the decision of the jury alone…Jurymen are 
the sole arbiters on questions of fact’. 
90 Gertsch op cit (note 6 above) 278. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ferrand v Bingley Township District Local Board (8 T.L.R) at 71. 
94 Metropolitan Raillway Co. v. Jackson (1877) 3 App. Cas. 193. 
95 Gertsch op cit (note 6 above) 278. 
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rights of the accused, by ignoring the fact that the prosecution, in terms of the principles of an 
adversarial trial, was under a duty, as the alleger, to present an evidentially concrete case.96 
 
When looking at the above responses to the issue, on what constitutes ‘sufficient’ evidence, 
and the respective roles played by the judge and the jury in deciding this, it is inevitable that 
they seek to protect the establishment of the jury and its function as a trier of fact as well as 
ensuring that the judiciary serves to prevent perverse convictions by the jury.97 In a nutshell, 
the responses seek to ensure a fair balance of power is struck between the jury and the judiciary. 
 
2.4 The abolition of the jury trial in South Africa 
 
The ‘device of by-passing the jury’, when the prosecution presented an evidentially weak case, 
was then ‘inherited’ by South Africa,98 when the ‘trial by jury’ still formed part of South 
African law.99  
 
In fact even after the jury was abolished in South Africa, the discharge provision remained in 
South African law. This was a peculiar route that was taken as, evidently, one of the major 
reasons for the formation of a discharge procedure was to prevent the jury from making 
perverse convictions, and hence this was now rendered pointless as the jury was abolished. 
 
As a result of the jury being abolished in South Africa, the jury’s role as a trier of fact was then 
taken up by the judge or magistrate.100 Consequently, the presiding officer became blessed with 
the power to determine questions of both law and fact. Therefore, from the commencement of 
the trial the judge or magistrate could deal with the common questions of ‘relevance and 
admissibility of the evidence’ as well as its ‘factual aspects’.101 
 
The judge or magistrate, with his fused powers, and having all of the evidence in front of him, 
is therefore in a position to assess the quality and quantum of evidence against the accused 
when faced with a discharge application. In this respect, Gertsch correctly points out: 
                                                          
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid 279. 
98 Section 221(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of 1917, as well as s 157(3) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955. 
99 Gertsch op cit (note 6 above) 279. 
100 Ibid 280. 
101 Ibid. 
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‘Why should it [the court, and hence the judge or magistrate] have to blinker itself from taking 
into account, for example, the effects wrought upon credibility by cross-examination of the 
state witnesses, or even from considering the consequences of contradictions within the 
prosecution's case as a whole?’102 
 
Gertsch further states: 
‘…if we begin with the premise that the application for discharge is a device to prevent the 
accused from having to reply to inadequate prosecution cases, any limitations thereafter on the 
scope of the judicial officer's examination of the evidence appear highly artificial’.103 
 
The South African courts however took a completely different view on the merged powers now 
in the hands of a judge or magistrate. Up until recent times, South African courts have 
constantly been against the idea that the credibility of the prosecution’s evidence should be 
considered when deciding on the merits of a discharge application.104 The South African courts 
probably took this view as, before the demise of the jury, the jury had to determine the 
credibility of the prosecution’s evidence. However, in light of this, South African courts have 
not provided any solid guidelines of what then constitutes an acceptable analysis of evidence 
when considering an application for discharge. 
 
Hence, there are two major criticisms of the way in which s 174 of the Act is applied. First, it 
is evident by the responses of the South African courts that the effects of the trial by jury, along 
with its procedural and evidential rules, have not completely been abolished from the South 
African system of law.  
 
Secondly, the perspective that was taken by our courts, that the credibility of the prosecution’s 
evidence should not be considered when taking into account an application for discharge has 
been a matter for debate. It has been argued that the judge is capable enough to determine the 
weight of the evidence once the State has closed its case as he is during judgement, once the 
defence case is closed.105 
 
                                                          
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid 280 - 281.  
104 Dladla supra (note 33 above) at 923F; National Board of Executors supra (n34) at 819; Mpetha supra (note 5 
above) at 265D-G. 
105 R Pattenden 'The submission of no case-some recent developments' (1982) Criminal LR 558, 564. 
20 
 
As a result, it has been argued that the credibility of the prosecution’s evidence should be fully 
taken into consideration by a judge or magistrate when deciding on an application for discharge 
at the end of the prosecution’s case. Accordingly, the judge or magistrate deciding on such a 
matter would have to enquire whether, when viewed entirely, the prosecution adduced evidence 
against the accused that was ‘reasonably believable’.106 Gertsch states: 
‘Such a test would restore meaning to the accused's discharge right by firmly eliminating the 
confusing echoes of the jury system’.107 
 
The same view was subsumed in various cases.108 However in the case of S v Mpetha109 it was 
argued that in deciding a discharge, at this stage of the proceedings, credibility should play a 
limited role. Further, the court held that such evidence will be disregarded if it were of ‘such a 
poor quality that no reasonable person could possibly accept it’.110 This is the more preferable 
view.111 
 
Hence, only where the evidence tendered by the prosecution is unreasonably weak the court 
should uphold an application for discharge made by the accused at the end of the prosecution’s 
case.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
In analysing the background and origin of s 174 of the Act one can conclude that, initially, the 
purpose of the English influenced discharge provision in South African law, summarily, was 
to enable the judiciary to have some control over the jury and bypass the jury where the 
prosecution presented unsubstantial evidence on which to base a conviction. The jury was a 
composition of lay persons, and had been formed as a result of the need to ensure that the 
judiciary did not act arbitrarily when reaching decisions. However, the judiciary soon realised 
that there was the possibility that the jury could make perverse decisions. As a result, the 
discharge procedure was formulated as a tool to ensure that the jury would not breach the fair 
trial rights’ of the accused as the very institution in place to protect the accused. 
                                                          
106 Gertsch op cit (note 6 above) 282. 
107 Ibid. 
108 S v Nandha Gopal Naidoo 1966 (1) PH H104 (w); R v Nortje 1961 (2) PH H166 (O); S v Bouwer 1964 (3) 
SA 800 (O); and Mpetha supra (note 5 above) at 265D – G. 
109 Mpetha supra (note 5 above) 
110 Ibid at 265D – G. 
111 Agliotti supra (note 11 above) at 261. 
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What then flowed from this, is the mechanism formulated to keep evidentially weak 
prosecution cases from the hands of the jury. Even after the abolition of the jury in South 
Africa, this mechanism remained in South African law despite the alterations to the court 
structure. Such a mechanism currently takes the form of s 174 of the Act. 
 
Looking at these circumstances, the question that immediately arises is, since trial by jury has 
been abolished in South African law and there is no longer a need to caution against perverse 
verdicts by the jury, is it still essential to the South African legal system to retain the procedure 
for discharge of an accused at the end of the prosecution’s case? This question will be answered 
in the chapters to come.   
 
The following chapter will look at how the discharge procedure is implemented in Canada in 
order to assess whether, even though the jury system of adjudication has been abolished from 
South African law, it still has relevance in our law and is being properly executed. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SECTION 548(1) OF THE CANADIAN CRIMINAL CODE: DISCHARGE AFTER A 
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
‘Discharge’ is not a provision that is exclusive to South African law; many other countries have 
incorporated such provisions in their law. The questions that then emerge are do all countries 
view the discharge of an accused through the same spectrum, and, if not, is the South African 
provision on par with other countries? 
 
Whilst most countries make provision in their law that allows the accused to be discharged 
from the offence allegedly committed, there is no universal provision for discharging an 
accused. In fact, countries have tailored their ‘discharge’ provisions in a manner that best suits 
their law. Furthermore, discharge is not limited to one stage of the criminal process and may 
be incorporated at different stages as will be seen. 
 
In order to thoroughly evaluate s 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act and assess its significance 
in South African law, one needs to look at how such provision, or similar provision, is dealt 
with in other jurisdictions. In order to discover any shortcomings inherent in s 174 of the Act, 
the section must be compared to a similar provision in another jurisdiction, and evaluate how 
the provision operates there. In this regard the jurisdiction selected is Canada.  
 
Canada is chosen since it has a Constitution that recognises rights in a substantially similar way 
to South Africa. Furthermore, both South Africa and Canada have mutual common law 
origins112 and are commonwealth countries.113 Consequently, it is compelling to compare s 174 
of the Act with a jurisdiction that operates under a similar system of law to South Africa. 
 
                                                          
112 JP Jansen Van Vuuren A Legal Comparison between South African, Canadian and Australian Workmen’s 
Compensation Law (Unpublished LLM thesis, University of South Africa, 2003) 15. 
113 ‘The Commonwealth’ available at http://thecommonwealth.org/member-countries, accessed on 17 August 
2017. 
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The purpose of this chapter is thus to provide a means of comparison between the Canadian 
provisions on discharge and the South African equivalent which will be done in a subsequent 
chapter. 
 
This chapter will therefore comprise of an in depth analysis of the discharge of an accused in 
the law of Canada and a critical evaluation of the relevant discharge provisions. 
 
3.2. Discharge of an accused in Canada 
 
The Canadian Criminal Code114 is an extensive piece of legislation providing guidance for 
every aspect of the criminal trial in Canada. In terms of this legislation an accused can be 
discharged at two stages of the criminal trial. 
 
First, the accused may be discharged at the end of a preliminary inquiry in terms of s 548(1) of 
the Code, where if at the end of the Crown’s case the judge is of the opinion that the Crown 
has not provided satisfactory evidence on which to connect the accused to the alleged charges, 
for a conviction. 
 
Secondly, the accused can also be discharged in terms of s 730(1) of the Code, at the sentencing 
stage, after his guilt has been established, if it is in the interests of the accused and not contrary 
to public policy to discharge the accused. 
 
For the purposes of this dissertation, only the former provision will be discussed as it centres 
on similar principles to those in s 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the principle being that 
the accused should not have to put up a defence to a seemingly hopeless State case. 
 
3.3 Section 548(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code 
 
Discharge in Canada is found in s 548(1), under Part XVIII of the Code, and is possible 
outcome of a preliminary inquiry, in which the Crown has to establish a case against the 
accused. A preliminary inquiry may only be conducted for indictable offences.115 The ultimate 
                                                          
114 Criminal Code R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 (hereafter referred to as the ‘Code’). 
115 ‘Robbery, murder, aggravated assault, trafficking in cocaine are all examples of Indictable offences. 
Canadian criminal law considers these types of crimes as the most serious. The above examples of indictable 
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purpose of the preliminary enquiry is to ascertain whether the Crown has provided sufficient 
evidence against the accused before the Justice can commit the matter to trial at a higher 
court.116 
 
Therefore, although a preliminary inquiry may seem like a trial, it essentially is not, in the sense 
that only the Crown is required to present evidence, susceptible to cross-examination, and not 
the accused. Although, the accused is not precluded from putting up a defence at the inquiry.117 
 
The procedure for a preliminary inquiry involves a request on record, which is made either by 
the Crown or the defence, for a preliminary enquiry.118 If the Crown or defence fails to make 
such a request then such failure will result to the assumption that the parties have waived the 
right to the inquiry and a date for trial will be set.119 Where there are multiple accused, and one 
accused makes a request for a preliminary inquiry, every accused must move to the inquiry, 
except where a severance application is successful.120 
 
Section 548(1) of the Code accordingly deals with the order of an accused to stand trial at the 
end of the preliminary inquiry and reads as follows: 
‘(1) when all the evidence has been taken by the justice, he shall 
 
(a) if in his opinion there is sufficient evidence to put the accused on trial for the offence charged 
or any other indictable offence in respect of the same transaction, order the accused to stand 
trial; or  
 
(b) discharge the accused, if in his opinion on the whole of the evidence no sufficient case is 
made out to put the accused on trial for the offence charged or any other indictable offence in 
respect of the same transaction’. 
 
                                                          
offence would entitle an accused person to a preliminary hearing. These indictable offences also give the person 
facing charges the right to have a trial by jury should that be their choice. Murder cases are all mandatory jury 
trials unless the Crown Attorney consents to a trial by judge alone’: ‘The Preliminary Hearing’ available at 
https://www.weisberg.ca/faq-preliminary-hearing/, accessed on 18 August 2017. 
116 R v O’Connor (1995) 191 NR 1 (SCC) at 134. 
117 Section 454(3) of the Code. 
118 Section 536(3) of the Code. 
119 Section 536 (4.3) of the Code. 
120 Section 536 (4.2) of the Code. 
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In the case of Skogman v The Queen121 the court held that the overall purpose of a preliminary 
inquiry is: 
‘…to protect the accused from a needless, and indeed, improper, exposure to public trial where 
the enforcement agency is not in possession of evidence to warrant the continuation of the 
process’.122 
 
Silver also comments on this procedural device and states: 
‘Ironically, the principle argument advanced in favour of eliminating the grand jury inquiry, 
which Supreme Court of Canada Justice Gwynne called in the 1891 debate “more ludicrous 
than real,” was the existence of the preliminary inquiry as the true procedural safeguard against 
the power of the State’.123 
 
Therefore, where the Crown’s evidence is too weak to establish a case against the accused, the 
accused will be discharged from the charges he faces. 
 
Conducting a preliminary inquiry prior to trial serves to balance the interests of both the 
accused and the State. The State, as the alleger, is by no means jeopardised in having to make 
out a case against the accused. Likewise, the accused should not have to respond to an 
unsubstantial, frivolous prosecution case. However, there are advantages and disadvantages 
with holding a preliminary inquiry. These will be discussed in due course.  
 
Furthermore, certain issues arise in the implementation of s 548(1). These issues predominantly 
arise in instances where the Crown’s evidence against the accused is weak and does not make 
out a case against the accused, and, the accused is subsequently committed to trial instead of 
being discharged. Under these circumstances the accused’s constitutionally protected rights 
may be infringed. Another issue is how much, or, what evidence is the Crown supposed to 
adduce to bypass the accused being discharged? Lastly, does the judge need to delve into the 
credibility of the Crown’s evidence at this stage? 
  
                                                          
121 Skogman v The Queen [1984] 2 SCR 93. 
122 Ibid at 105. 
123 L Silver ‘Does the Stinert Decision Signal the End of the Preliminary Inquiry?’ (2015) available at 
https://ablawg.ca/2015/04/17/does-the-stinert-decision-signal-the-end-of-the-preliminary-inquiry/, accessed on 
17 August 2017. 
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Therefore, this chapter will commence by looking closely at the interpretation of the section 
and then discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the preliminary inquiry. 
 
3.3.1 The accused’s right to be presumed innocent until found guilty   
 
Section 548(1) is similar to the South African discharge provision, the difference being in the 
stages of the criminal process at which discharge is considered. In South Africa discharge is 
considered during trial after the State has presented all its evidence, whereas, in Canada 
discharge may be considered prior to trial and again at the end of the trial.  
 
The notion on which s 548(1) of the Code is fundamentally created, akin to the purpose of s 
174 of the Criminal Procedure Act, is to protect the rights of an individual faced with a criminal 
charge. 
 
In the case of Dubois v R,124 Lamer J referred to s (11)(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms125 which guarantees every accused person certain rights and states that every 
accused person has the right: 
‘…to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by 
an independent and impartial tribunal’. 
 
Section 11(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedom is a pivotal right in the Canadian 
Constitution, as well as, the criminal justice system at large. It is a right that needs to be 
consistently maintained at every stage of the proceedings, starting from the initial detention of 
the accused, to the trial and through to the sentencing stage.126 
 
Lamer J held that this right that the accused is gifted with requires the Crown, in the 
presentation of its evidence, to make out a case pointing to the accused’s guilt, before the 
defence is to respond.127 Lamer J further stated, that this protection is afforded to the accused, 
                                                          
124 Dubois v R (1985) 23 DLR (4th) 503. 
125 Schedule B of the Constitution of Canada 1982. 
126 A Presumption of Innocence is a Fundamental Principle in Canadian Law available at 
https://www.kruselaw.ca/blogpost/a-presumption-of-innocence-is-a-fundamental-principal-in-canadian-law, 
accessed on 17 August 2017. 
127 Dubois supra (note 123 above). 
27 
 
not in the light that he does not need to testify, but rather, because the prosecution must prove 
its allegations before any expectation that the accused will put up a defence.128 
 
In the case of R v Oakes129 the court held the right to be presumed innocent entails that:  
‘(i) an accused must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, (ii) the prosecution must bear 
the onus of proof and (iii) criminal prosecutions must be carried out in accordance with lawful 
procedures and principles of fairness’. 
 
Therefore where the court remits the accused to trial on insufficient evidence, the court is in 
effect breaching the accused’s right to a fair trial.  
 
3.3.2 Evidence at the stage of the preliminary inquiry 
 
In respect of s 548(1), the Court must inevitably determine whether there is any admissible 
evidence in terms of which, a reasonable jury, ‘properly instructed’, could find the accused 
guilty.130 
 
Therefore, where the prosecution adduces evidence that establishes every single element of the 
offence with which the accused is charged, then the court must direct the accused to stand 
trial.131 ‘Exculpatory evidence will not result in a discharge of the charges’.132 This is evidence 
that is favourable to the accused’s case which may negate the accused’s guilt. It is only when 
both the prosecution and defence have presented their case that such evidence may properly be 
determined. 
 
Additionally, where the evidence presented is merely circumstantial, the court must then 
employ a ‘limited weighing’ of all the evidence in order to establish whether a ‘reasonable 
jury’, which is ‘properly instructed’, could find the accused guilty on the circumstantial 
                                                          
128 Ibid. 
129 R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200. 
130 R v Arcuri [2001] 2 SCR 828 2001 SCC; United States of America v Shephard [1977] 2 SCR 1067; Mezzo v 
R [1986] 1 SCR 802; Dubois v The Queen [1986] 1 SCR 366; R v Charemski [1998] 1 SCR 679; R v 
Monteleone [1987] 2 SCR 154. 
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evidence.133 This is the test to be applied in testing the Crown’s evidence. Such a deduction 
comprises of a consideration of whether there is a reasonable likelihood that an inference may 
be drawn from the evidence that points to the possible guilt of the accused.134 
 
3.3.3 The credibility of the Crown’s evidence  
 
Thus far it has been argued that in order for the court to discharge the accused person, and thus, 
disqualify him from standing trial, the court must be of the view that the Crown’s case is 
evidentiary insufficient. And this is also so, in order to uphold the accused’s right to be 
presumed innocent until found guilty. In establishing whether the Crown has produced 
‘sufficient’ evidence, the issue that arises, an issue common to s 174 of the Act, is if the 
credibility of the Crown’s witnesses should be considered at the preliminary inquiry, and, if so, 
the extent of which credibility should be taken into account. 
 
Campbell CJ could not have dealt with the issue of credibility any better in the case of Perry v 
The King135 where he held: 
‘On the conclusion of the evidence for the respondent, counsel for the appellant has moved that 
the appeal be allowed, as no prima facie case of guilt had been proved against the appellant. No 
authorities were cited to indicate just what cogency of proof is required to establish a prima 
facie case at that stage, and I have not run across any case in which the point was settled. I 
presume, therefore, that, in order to put the accused on his defence, a Judge or Magistrate sitting 
alone need find only such evidence as would entitle the Crown, in a jury case, to have the facts 
left to the decision of the jury. In other words, the criterion would be whether the evidence is 
such as a jury might, in the absence of contradiction or explanation, reasonably and properly 
convict upon. This view is supported by the wording of the Code, s. 726, which provides that 
the Justice shall consider the whole matter after hearing what each party has to say and the 
witnesses and evidence adduced. The Justice or Judge, therefore, apparently does not exercise 
the function of a jury until both sides have completed their case; and the question of proof 
beyond reasonable doubt does not arise at this stage’.136 
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Keeping the issue of credibility in mind, in the case of Metropolitan Railway Co. v Jackson,137 
Lord Cairns stated that the judge and jury have distinct duties. The Judge has the duty to see, 
from the evidence, whether any facts have been established from which a reasonable inference 
may be drawn that the accused was negligent. By contrast, the jury’s duty is to establish, from 
those facts given to them, whether ‘negligence ought to be inferred’.138 Lord Cairns holds 
further that, the maintenance of this distinction is essential in the administration of justice. 
 
In the case of Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions139 the judge, Viscount Sankey, 
LC, held that it is only at the close of the defence case, that is, once all evidence has been 
tendered by both the Crown and the defence that a verdict of guilt or innocence can properly 
be pronounced.140 
 
Therefore, to sum up the above positions, the judge, at the preliminary stage, should only 
concern himself with the facts from which an inference may be drawn of the accused’s guilt. 
All that is needed is a mere connection. The Crown does not have to prove that the accused is 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt at this stage of the proceedings. 
 
Therefore, too much emphasis should not be placed on how credible the Crown’s evidence is 
at the preliminary stage. Credibility is not the issue at this stage. The issue is purely one of 
whether there is any evidence which infers that the accused may have committed the crime. 
This is all that is required in deciding whether discharge should ensue. 
 
3.3.4 Advantages of a preliminary inquiry for the defence 
 
Apart from not having to answer and thereby put up a defence to a pointless case, preliminary 
inquiries provide the defence with various additional advantages. 
 
First, the preliminary inquiry is a ‘means of discovery’.141 At the inquiry the ‘nature and 
strength’ of the Crown’s case can be ascertained by the defence.142 Connections are drawn 
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between the offence committed and the accused.143 Hence, the accused becomes cognisant of 
the exact case he needs to meet should the matter advance to trial.144  
 
With this discovery feature inherent in the preliminary inquiry, the defence will usually elect 
that a preliminary inquiry be conducted so as to obtain, to the fullest extent, disclosure of the 
evidence against the accused.145 With the further opportunity to cross-examine the Crown’s 
witnesses, the defence is free to ‘exhaust all the knowledge of each witness on the particular 
aspect of the case for which each is called’.146 Moreover, the defence will have the ability to 
refine and tie down the evidence presented by each witness, thus, if their testimony varies later 
on at trail, such variance would prove to be ‘fatal’ in respect of that witnesses credibility.147 
 
However, it is uncertain as to whether the Crown is obliged to reveal all the proof in its 
possession at the preliminary inquiry.148 It is clear from judicial decisions, that the Crown must 
put forward all the evidence in its possession, whether for or against the accused, at trial, 
conversely, no such pronouncements are made with regard to the preliminary inquiry.149 
 
Nonetheless, there are cases in which the court had asked the Crown to produce witness 
statements during the preliminary inquiry.150 Thereby, implying that the court has the authority 
to order the Crown to present certain evidence. However, this finding is open to doubt as the 
extent of evidence that the Crown should adduce during the preliminary inquiry is still 
unclear.151 
 
As there is no definitive obligation on the Crown to produce all its evidence, the defence can 
elicit the names of other witnesses during cross-examination and then ‘call’ those witnesses as 
‘witnesses for the defence’.152 In this manner, the defence is able to obtain the greatest 
disclosure at the inquiry.153 This approach was given approval in the case of R v Mishko.154 
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During the preliminary inquiry in this case, which involved a bank robbery, the Crown called 
only two witnesses. The defence, during cross-examination, discovered that there were actually 
six witnesses in the bank at the time the incident occurred and ‘elicited’ their details.155 The 
defence thereafter sought to call the remaining witnesses in an attempt to obtain full disclosure 
of the Crown’s case. The Crown objected, holding that they were not defence witnesses and 
the defence could not attain disclosure of their case in this manner. The magistrate upheld the 
Crown’s contentions. However, on review, the court held that the defence was not precluded 
from acting the way they did. 
 
Secondly, the preliminary inquiry serves as an ‘early opportunity’ for the defence to prove the 
accused’s innocence.156 At the preliminary inquiry, the accused has the right, if he desires to 
utilise it, of giving evidence himself and to call witnesses at the preliminary inquiry.157 
Therefore, where the accused feels that he can prove he is innocent in terms of the allegations 
against him, he can exercise his right to testify and call witnesses to clear any misconceptions, 
thereby dispensing with the case early.158 
 
3.3.5 Advantages of a preliminary inquiry for the prosecution 
 
One might question why the prosecution would want to request for a preliminary inquiry after 
which the accused is susceptible to discharge. However, as will be seen, a preliminary inquiry 
may prove to be more advantageous to the prosecution than to the defence. 
 
The first advantage of a preliminary hearing for the prosecution is in terms of s 619 of the 
Code. All the evidence presented in the inquiry is recorded159 and s 619 of the Code stipulates 
that if a witness at the inquiry dies before trial, becomes ill, or insane, is not able to travel, is 
not in the country, or declines to be sworn, the evidence from the inquiry may be read into the 
trial. 
 
Section 619 of the Code thus protects the prosecution in cases where witnesses disappear before 
or during the trial. 
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Another advantage for the prosecution is that the preliminary inquiry provides the prosecution 
with the chance to ‘bind the witnesses over to testify at trial and thus keeps witnesses within 
control’.160 
 
Furthermore, in terms of s 461 of the Code, where an accused has to proceed to trial, the 
magistrate may call any witness whose evidence is material to the trial, and if such a witness 
declines, he may be imprisoned. 
 
Thirdly, a preliminary inquiry is a means of convincing witnesses with material knowledge of 
the offence to testify.161 This is done by subpoenaing witnesses who are believed to have 
information relevant to the crime to the preliminary inquiry.162 If they do not attend they may 
be punished by the court.163 
 
Fourthly, the preliminary inquiry is a superb mechanism for testing the complaints alleged by 
the witnesses for the prosecution.164 The true motives of witnesses can be ascertained, thereby 
preventing prosecutions founded on ‘misinformation, prejudice and malicious motives’.165 
 
Fifthly, circumstances may arise where the prosecution is induced to arrest a person suspected 
of the offence, but at that particular point the prosecution does not have the evidence to 
establish that the suspect is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.166 Thus, with the aid of the 
preliminary inquiry, the court will have authority over the accused while the prosecution has 
the time to collect the evidence for trial that will establish a solid case against the accused.167 
This is a means of buying time. 
 
Lastly, another advantage is that a preliminary inquiry is a procedure that can be utilised to 
satisfy public pressures by initiating criminal proceedings in controversial cases that draw on 
public attention, but where evidence is still lacking.168 
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3.3.6 Disadvantages of a preliminary inquiry 
 
One of the most acknowledged disadvantages to an accused that comes with choosing to hold 
a preliminary inquiry is that the accused becomes at risk to encounter ‘prejudice to a fair trial’ 
as a consequence of reports by the press on the inquiry.169 In certain circumstances such reports 
may be so daunting on the accused that it affects his ability to go before an ‘unprejudiced 
jury’.170 Furthermore, there is increased risk of the possibility of such prejudice as, at the 
preliminary inquiry, only the prosecution’s case is revealed.171 It is noteworthy to add, that 
there can be no restriction placed on the press in this regard due to the notion of a free press. 
 
Another major disadvantage to the accused is, if he decides to testify at the preliminary hearing, 
then such evidence may be read into the trial.172 The cross-examination or ‘fishing’ by the 
Crown of this evidence at the inquiry may cause the accused to respond badly, and such 
responses will be read during the trial.173 Additionally, the accused could be disadvantaged by 
incriminating testimonies from witnesses at the preliminary inquiry.174 The evidence may 
show, by inference, that the accused is connected to the crime, and, even worse, this may be 
read at the trial. The defence will be unable to attack the witness’s credibility at this stage.175 
 
The most significant disadvantage of holding a preliminary inquiry is the expense and delay 
caused by what is in essence a ‘double hearing’.176 It is obvious however, in cases where the 
accused is discharged, and the Crown avoids proceeding against him again on the same 
charges, that the Crown as well as the accused avoid the cost of a public trial.177 
 
Conversely, delay is inevitably a disadvantage to an accused who is innocent and to an accused 
who is well aware that the prosecution has charged him with the offence without all the 
necessary evidence on which to convict him.178 In such an instance the delay would be in favour 
of the prosecution’s case. 
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In addition, an accused has much scope to establish a maximum delay of the criminal 
proceedings in Canada. On his first appearance for election, he may ask the court for, and will 
generally be allowed, a remand of a week or two to see his counsel or on any other reasonable 
grounds.179 When the accused returns to court for election, and decides to elect for a 
preliminary inquiry the matter will, in most instances, adjourn for a month or so.180 Thereafter, 
there is a high possibility of the court further adjourning before the preliminary inquiry actually 
takes place and he is sent to trial.181 The whole process become tedious. 
 
Lastly, the prosecution has the probability of being disadvantaged by a preliminary inquiry as 
a result of perjury and by the accused forming an alibi.182 During the preliminary inquiry the 
prosecution’s witnesses are persuaded by both the prosecution and defence to testify on all they 
know about the offence. As a result, the accused is able to extract the precise facts surrounding 
the offence, such as ‘times and dates’.183 Thus, the accused forming an alibi is highly probable. 
Hence, the preliminary inquiry has the ability to deter the Crown’s case in the event of the 
accused electing to testify during the inquiry, or further if the matter goes to trial. 
 
In Canada, some security is given against the above situation arising. The protection emerges 
out of the rules laid out by the Supreme Court of Canada184 where the court held that if an alibi 
is not set at an early point of the proceedings, prior to or at the inquiry, then observation of this 
very fact by the trial judge will definitely weaken the truth of the alibi.185 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
Under the Canadian legal provisions, a preliminary inquiry prior to conducting a trial protects 
the accused’s rights which are guaranteed to every accused in the Canadian Constitution. 
Committing an accused to trial where the Crown’s case is insufficient to make out a case against 
the accused would be a gross indignity to the accused. The evidence tendered by the Crown 
need not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Lastly, credibility of the Crown’s witnesses is 
not a matter of concern at the inquiry and should be reserved for trial. 
                                                          
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Halyk op cit (note 141 above) 220. 
184 Russell v The King 67 CCC 28 [1936] 4 DLR 744 (SCC). 
185 Ibid. 
35 
 
The preliminary inquiry in Canadian Criminal law seems logical. However, as can be seen 
from the above, a preliminary inquiry may be selected for ulterior purposes. It may be used as 
a mechanism of discovery, as a device to secure and control witnesses, as a means for testing 
the motives of the Crown’s witnesses and as a tactic for delay. These ancillary purposes are not 
forbidden. However, they detract from the primary purpose of a preliminary inquiry, thereby 
making the inquiry subject to doubt. It must be stressed that the primary purpose of the inquiry 
is to see if any inference of guilt may be drawn from the Crown’s evidence so that the matter 
may proceed to trial. 
 
It is inevitable that the effectiveness and efficiency of the preliminary inquiry therefore 
becomes questionable. There has thus been debate in Canada about whether the inquiry should 
be removed from Canadian law.186  
 
In the case of R v Darby187 the court concluded the following with regard to the preliminary 
inquiry 
‘…the preliminary hearing or preliminary inquiry has been turned into a nightmarish experience 
for any provincial court judge. Rules with respect to relevancy have been widened beyond 
recognition. Cross-examination at a preliminary inquiry now seems to have no limits.  Attempts 
by provincial court judges to limit cross-examination have been perceived by some superior 
courts as a breach of the accused’s right to fundamental justice, a breach of his or her ability to 
be able to make full answer and defence…The present state of the preliminary inquiry is akin 
to a rudderless ship on choppy waters. The preliminary hearing has been turned into a free-for-
all, a living hell for victims of crime and witnesses who are called to take part in this archaic 
ritual’.188  
 
The above quote leads one to believe that the underlying purpose of the preliminary inquiry 
has been overtaken by all the ancillary motives for which the procedure is being used. If such 
a provision were to remain in Canadian Criminal law then the foundational values for the 
inquiry need to be re-established. 
 
                                                          
186 L Silver ‘Does the Stinert Decision Signal the End of the Preliminary Inquiry?’ (2015). Available at 
https://ablawg.ca/2015/04/17/does-the-stinert-decision-signal-the-end-of-the-preliminary-inquiry/, accessed on 
18 August 2017. 
187 R v Darby [1994] BCJ No. 814 (Prov. Ct.). 
188 Ibid para 9-10. 
 
36 
 
CHAPTER 4 
A RECENT APPLICATION OF SECTION 174 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
ACT 51 OF 1977: S V DEWANI 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
After tracing the origins of the discharge provision and looking at the provision from a 
Canadian perspective, it is now apposite to look at a fairly recent application for discharge in 
South Africa. It can be argued that since 2014 no conversation on s 174 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 can ever proceed without a discussion of the case of S v Dewani.189  
 
The Dewani case renders the judicial pronouncements by South African courts on the 
interpretation and application of s 174 of the Act futile. The court in Dewani had failed to 
properly consider the test for discharge and the issue of credibility. Thus, the case a typical 
example of the potential danger that accompanies s 174 of the Act because of the courts’ almost 
unfettered discretion in respect of discharging an accused person. 
 
This chapter will therefore comprise of a thorough analysis of the case of S v Dewani and 
evaluates the trial court’s decision in discharging the accused.  
 
4.2 A brief overview of the case of S v Dewani 
 
Shrien Dewani, a British businessman, was suspected of entering into a conspiracy in which 
his newlywed Swedish wife, Anni Dewani, was killed while they were honeymooning in Cape 
Town.190 
 
On their arrival at Cape Town International Airport on 12 November 2010, the couple secured 
the taxi services of one Zola Tongo, a taxi driver by profession, who became their tour guide 
for the rest of their trip.191 Tongo thereafter dropped the couple at Cape Grace Hotel where the 
                                                          
189 Dewani supra (note 5 above). 
190‘Honeymoon murder: Timeline of events for Shrien Dewani’ available at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
england-bristol-13226067, accessed on 24 November 2017. 
191 ‘Honeymoon killing ‘by arrangement’’ available at https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/honeymoon-
killing-by-arrangement-1666456, accessed on 24 November 2017. 
37 
 
accused allegedly inquired whether Tongo knew of any hitman, as he sought to plan a hit on 
his ‘business partner’.192 
 
The incident that occurred on 13 November 2010, in which Tongo’s Volkswagen Sharan was 
hijacked by Mziwamadoda Qwabe and Xolile Mngeni in Gugulethu, Cape Town, inexorably 
formed part of a greater conspiracy to kill Anni Dewani.193 The couple was hijacked at 
gunpoint, after which Tongo, and then, Dewani were told to exit the vehicle (unharmed) a short 
drive later.194 Mrs Dewani’s body was subsequently found lifeless on the back seat of the 
vehicle on 14 November 2010, after being shot in the neck.195 
 
Arrests were made only days after the crime as a result of Qwabe, Mngeni and Monde 
Mbolombo’s admissions to the robbery/kidnapping that preceded Mrs Dewani’s death.196 Due 
to receive the sentence of life imprisonment, Qwabe and Mblombo claimed that this was no 
ordinary hijacking, rather, it was a premeditated murder ignited by the deceased’s husband.197 
 
Initially Tongo played victim to the hijacking, but faced with compelling evidence ‘implicating 
him in the crime’ and his fellow conspirator’s change of heart to implicate Dewani, he too 
argued ‘that the husband was the instigator’.198 
 
As a result Dewani, the accused, was charged with the following criminal offences: 
a) ‘Conspiracy to commit the offences of kidnapping, robbery with aggravating circumstances 
and murder (count 1); 
b) Kidnapping (count 2); 
c) Robbery with aggravating circumstances (count 3); 
d) Murder (count 4); and  
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e) Obstructing the administration of justice (count 5).’199 
 
Qwabe and Tongo were offered a reduced sentence in exchange for pleading guilty to the 
crimes. In addition, they were also required to testify on behalf of the State, against the accused, 
and in respect of any other criminal litigation that may pertain to the crime.200 The plea bargains 
were entered into in terms of s 105A201 of the Criminal Procedure Act.202 Mbolombo, on the 
other hand, was granted immunity from being prosecuted in accordance with s 204203 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act204 similarly in exchange for a testimony against the accused and in 
respect of any other litigation that might be forthcoming.205  
 
It is evident why Tongo was a key witness for the State, as he was the only witness who could 
link the accused to this conspiracy.206 He was the only person who directly interacted with the 
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accused. Thus, Tongo’s testimony needed to be corroborated by the testimonies of Qwabe and 
Mbolomo as well as other State evidence.207 
 
After revealing manifold contradictions in, and among, the testimonies presented by the State’s 
witnesses, the court upheld the application for discharge made by the defence at the end of the 
State’s case, and the accused was consequently found not guilty of the charges.208 
 
4.3 The legal position summarised 
 
In chapter one the legal arguments surrounding the application of s 174 of the Act were 
discussed in some depth. Drawing on prior judgments, the legal position may be summed up 
as follows: 
 
a) The accused has a right to be discharged if, at the close of the State’s case, there is no 
possibility of convicting the accused other than if the accused testifies and incriminates 
himself;209 
 
b) The court, in determining whether or not to discharge the accused at the close of the 
State’s case, may consider the credibility of the witnesses for the State, ‘even if only to 
a limited extent’;210 and  
 
c) The State’s evidence may be ignored if it were of ‘such poor quality that no reasonable 
person could possibly accept it’,211 ‘and there is accordingly no credible evidence on 
record upon which a reasonable man, acting carefully, may convict’.212 In such an 
instance the accused should be discharged. 
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4.4 The contradictions exposed in the State’s evidence during cross-examination 
 
Judge Traverso, DJP described the evidence of the key witness, Tongo, as evidence ‘riddled 
with contradictions’.213 When challenged with these contradictions during cross-examination, 
Tongo maintained that he had ‘made a mistake’ or that ‘as time went by’ his memory improved 
regarding the fateful night.214 
 
The judge identified numerous variations between Tongo’s statement, affidavit and his 
evidence in chief about how the events had played out. The most significant discrepancies will 
be discussed below. An attempt will be made to place these inconsistencies in context with the 
way in which the sequel of events unfolded. 
 
First, Tongo testified that on arriving at the Cape Grace Hotel on 12 November 2010, the 
accused had indicated to him that he had a job for him and he told him what that job was after 
he checked in at the hotel.215 However, the version Tongo put forward in his affidavit was 
seemingly at odds with his testimony. In his affidavit, Tongo stated that the ‘job offer’ was 
made and discussed before the accused went to the reception to check in.216 
 
Upon realising that the job was to kill someone, Tongo indicated to the accused that he did not 
partake in such business but stated that he may know somebody who was associated with such 
jobs – Mbolombo.217 Judge Traverso stated that it is by chance that Mbolomlo almost instantly 
grabbed the offer to kill somebody and phoned Qwabe for assistance.218 
 
The next material contradiction that the judge relied on concerned the identity of the victim. 
Tongo identified the victim as a ‘client’ of the accused in his plea agreement.219 By contrast, 
during his testimony he described the victim to be the ‘business partner’ of the accused.220 He 
went so far as to say that the woman he picked up on the day the incident took place was not 
the same woman that accompanied the accused from the airport.221 However, in his statement 
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Tongo alleged that the ‘same lady’ he picked up from the airport got into his car on the Saturday 
the incident was planned.222 When faced with these contradictions he was quick to blame the 
Lieutenant who wrote down his statement.223  
 
Additionally, Tongo stated in both his affidavit and plea explanation that the accused inquired 
if he had known of any place where he, the accused, could exchange his dollars for rands, 
without having to ‘produce his passport’.224 Tongo believed that this would be the same money 
used to pay the hitmen.225 However, during ‘cross examination it transpired that the accused 
never indicated that he did not want to produce his passport’.226 Tongo argued that he said this 
in the mistaken belief ‘that the accused did not want to produce his passport’.227 Judge Traverso 
stated that these ‘extras’ were thrown in in an attempt to implicate the accused.228 
 
Upon a closer consideration of the testimony of Tongo, with regard to taking the accused to 
the ‘money changer’, Judge Traverso exposed more discrepancies. Tongo testified that on the 
Saturday morning that he was going to take the accused to change his dollars, the accused 
called him in a state of panic confirming their arrangements.229 However, CCTV footage 
showed the accused and deceased enjoying breakfast before they lounged at the hotel pool.230 
Evidence, in the form of a text message, further revealed that Tongo contacted the accused first 
to confirm their arrangements for that morning, and the accused replied saying, ‘okay, give me 
10 minutes’.231 Judge Traverso claimed that this indicated no rush on the part of the accused 
whatsoever.232  
 
Tongo also specified that on return to the Cape Grace Hotel, from the ‘money changer’, the 
accused told him that the murder should be staged as a hijacking, after which Tongo and the 
accused should be dropped off and the woman must thereafter be killed.233 Nevertheless, the 
CCTV footage showed the Volkswagen Sharan had returned to the hotel, but the car ‘hardly 
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stopped’ when the accused jumped out and entered the hotel.234 Caught out with this, Tongo 
changed his story to the conversation being conducted on the ride back to the hotel, calling this 
irregularity a ‘mistake’.235 
 
Turning to the hours preceding the incident, Judge Traverso indicated that Tongo’s reasoning 
on engaging the child locks of the rear doors was unlikely.236 Tongo explained that he did this 
as he was unaware of the precise side on which the deceased would sit.237 The judge indicated 
that this explanation by Tongo was unbelievable in the light of how the conspiracy was going 
to be carried out – Tongo was going to be dropped off first followed by the accused.238 Tongo 
also made no mention of engaging the child locks in his affidavit, but mentioned it in his 
testimony after being exposed on CCTV footage.239 
 
Furthermore, from Tongo’s evidence it was clear that the hijacking was to take place at an 
agreed spot in Gugulethu.240 Nevertheless, after fetching the accused and deceased, Tongo 
disclosed that upon realising that Qwabe and Mngeni were not at the scheduled spot in 
Gugulethu, he recommended that the couple go to Somerset West.241 However, the deceased 
already had a reservation at a restaurant at Somerset West which was made at the hotel.242 This 
latter fact made Tongo’s statement that he had recommended the couple go to Somerset West 
unbelievable. To this the judge suggested that ‘this was indeed a strange co-incidence’.243 
 
Upon closer analysis of the actual hijacking, during cross-examination it was exposed that there 
existed a further inconsistency with respect to where Tongo was sitting after the hijacking. It 
can be inferred from the accused’s plea explanation that Tongo was in the front passenger seat, 
as the accused stated that one of the hijackers jumped in the back seat next to him with a firearm 
in his hand.244 Tongo’s affidavit reflected the exact scenario that Dewani described. However, 
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during his testimony he stated that this setting was not true, as he was ‘forced to the rear seat’ 
with the deceased and accused and he did not have a firearm.245 
 
In his testimony about his place in the car, it was evident that Tongo had placed himself in a 
dilemma where he was in the back seat of the car where he had enabled the child locks. He was 
thus required to explain how he had exited the vehicle, because in his affidavit he mentioned 
‘the driver (Mr Qwabe) put his firearm to my head and ordered me out of the vehicle’.246 Yet 
again he attributed this statement to a mistake.247 
 
Nevertheless, Tongo testified that the armed men had requested they all put their heads down, 
and asked him to exit the car behind the Gugulethu police barracks.248 Tongo stated that he 
then went into the police station and reported the matter, but made a false statement,249 after 
which the police escorted him to the Cape Grace Hotel where the accused was already in the 
company of the police.250  
 
CCTV footage showed that the accused and Tongo had conversed on the terrace of the hotel 
after the hijacking.251 Tongo contended that during that time the accused continuously asked 
him whether he was ‘okay’, and whether the ‘job’ was completed.252 No mention of this 
conversation was made in Tongo’s affidavit.253 
 
CCTV footage also showed that Tongo had received an envelope from the accused in the hotel 
conference room on Tuesday, 16 November 2010.254 Tongo held that the accused had asked to 
meet him at the hotel to pay him the R5000 as previously promised.255 Tongo specified that he 
had not mentioned this scenario in his affidavit as ‘it would have increased his participation in 
the offence’.256 
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In summing up these contradictions it is inevitable that there were various inconsistencies in 
Tongo’s evidence, inconsistencies that had the ability to weaken the State’s case, and which 
did to a vast extent. However, it must be noted that the inconsistencies in Tongo’s evidence 
could be as a result of genuine mistakes and forgetfulness given the space in time from when 
the incident had occurred to when the trial actually commenced. 
 
4.5 Contradictions between State witnesses 
 
Judge Traverso stated that the testimonies of Qwabe and Mbolombo contradicted Tongo’s 
statements ‘in just about every aspect of their interactions’.257 
 
To keep matters clear and uncomplicated the inconsistencies in Tongo’s evidence and the 
inconsistencies among the witnesses’ evidence have been separated. In discussing the 
contradictions between the State’s witnesses, only those that the judge considered material in 
relation to Tongo’s evidence will be discussed here. 
 
First, On Friday, 12 November 2010, after leaving the Dewanis at Cape Grace Hotel, Tongo 
testified that he went to see Mbolombo at work. He told Mbolombo that he needed to speak to 
him and asked him if he knew of any hitmen.258 Mbolombo thereafter called Qwabe and 
expressed to him that he has a man with him by the name of Zola Tongo who was in search of 
a hitman.259 At that time Qwabe was in the presence of Mgneni.260 Tongo testified that Qwabe 
asked Mbolombo how much was involved and he replied saying that the accused was going to 
pay them R15 000.261 However, this statement was inconsistent with Qwabe’s. Qwabe testified 
that Tongo enquired how much it would cost for the hit and, upon consulting with Mngeni, he 
said he will do it for R15 000.262 
 
Secondly, during this same conversation, Tongo affirmed in his evidence that the accused was 
willing to pay the hitmen in dollars. Mbolombo passed this message on to Qwabe, whereupon 
Qwabe stated that they did not ‘want to be paid in dollars but in rands’.263 There is disparity 
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between Tongo’s evidence and Qwabe’s in this respect. Qwabe indicated that he did not 
remember the discussion with Mbolombo referring to dollars.264 
 
Lastly, Mbolombo testified that when Tongo had told him that there was someone who had to 
be killed he did not ask who the person to be killed is.265 However, Tongo testified that he told 
Mbolombo that Dewani wanted his ‘business partner' to be killed, and she would be arriving 
the next day.266 
 
4.6 The court’s ruling 
 
Judge Traverso stressed that the test to be applied when deciding whether to discharge the 
accused is to ask if a ‘reasonable court, acting carefully, might convict’ the accused on the 
evidence presented by the State.267 
 
The judge claimed that what was sought from Tongos’s evidence was corroboration that 
implicated the accused.268 She also conceded that there are indisputably fragments of Tongo’s 
evidence that implicated the accused but nevertheless declared that: 
‘…his evidence is of such a poor quality that one simply does not know where the lies end and 
the truth begins or vice versa. A court should not under those circumstances cherry pick certain 
parts of his evidence which can possibly be accepted and others which should be rejected. 
Reliable corroboration is required in such circumstances’.269 
 
The prosecution attempted to persuade the court that such corroboration existed by virtue of 
circumstantial evidence, in the form of the interactions between Tongo and the accused on the 
CCTV footage. However, the judge refused to take this into consideration, holding that it did 
not implicate the accused.270 The judge then concluded: 
‘Regrettably, there are many unanswered questions about what exactly happened on the fateful 
night. I realise that there is a strong public opinion that the accused should be placed on his 
defence. I have taken note of that. I have also taken note of the plight of the Hindochas. I have 
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however taken an oath of office to uphold the rule of law and to administer justice without fear, 
favour or prejudice. That I cannot do if I permit public opinion to influence my application of 
the law. If any court permitted public opinion, which has no legal basis to influence their 
judgments, it will lead to anarchy’.271 
 
Judge Traverso emphasised that she was blessed with the judicial discretion to decide to 
discharge the accused,272 and ultimately concluded that she did not find that the State had 
adduced sufficient evidence ‘upon which a reasonable court, acting carefully, might convict’ 
the accused.273 The judge then repeated the principle from the case of S v Lubuxa,274 and argued 
that the only compelling reason for rejecting the application for discharge by the defence, 
would be the hope that the accused will incriminate himself in the presentation his evidence, 
and this was a principle that is clearly frowned upon.275 
 
In these circumstances the court ordered that the application for discharge made by the defence 
in terms of s 174 of the Act be granted, and the accused be found not guilty of the charges.276 
 
4.7 An evaluation of the judgement 
 
In evaluating the case of S v Dewani two glaring aspects of the judgment need to be addressed 
and scrutinised. These include: the role of the judge at the discharge stage; and what amounts 
to corroboration of evidence in terms of s 174 of the Act.  
 
4.7.1 The role of the judge at the discharge stage 
 
The argument that may be put forward in assessing the court’s reasoning in Dewani is that the 
judge had misconstrued the test for discharge that has been developed by South African courts 
over decades, and as a result a miscarriage of justice has occurred.277 This is so because looking 
at the evidence, in the manner that one should view it at the stage of the discharge application 
assessment, the State had in fact made out a prima facie case against the accused, yet, the 
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accused was acquitted without presenting his defence.278 During his testimony Tongo indicated 
that on certain occasions he had met with the accused in which the accused had specified his 
plans to murder his wife.279 In accordance with Tongo’s testimony, the State produced evidence 
in the form of CCTV footage which confirmed ‘that meetings took place between the two at 
the times and in the places alleged by Tongo’.280 In this sense a prima facie case materialised 
which was sufficient for a rejection of the discharge application. 
 
The judge seemed to have misunderstood what is required of her when assessing the evidence 
at the stage when the State closes its case, and, when both the State and defence close their 
case.281 Judge Traverso should have set aside the inquiry into the credibility of the State’s 
evidence for the end of the trial. ‘The judge’s role in assessing a section 174 application is not 
to assess credibility’.282 
 
Furthermore, s 174 of the Act requires the court to comprehend the difference between cases 
in which the evidence the State produces gives the defence no case to answer and a case in 
which the evidence of the State proves the necessary elements of the offence for a reasonable 
person to convict.283 It is submitted that the court in Dewani had failed to establish this 
distinction as satisfactory evidence existed which the court ignored. 
 
After all, it must be emphasised that ‘the standard which the State’s evidence must meet at the 
close of its case, in order to avoid the accused being discharged, is lower than the standard that 
it must meet to secure the accused’s conviction’.284 The principle in Canada, is that all the court 
should look for at the stage of discharge is whether a reasonable inference may be drawn from 
the State’s evidence that the accused may be guilty of the crime.285 Similarly, in South Africa, 
the judge does not have to inquire whether the State has proved its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt at this point in the trial.  
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Another point that needs to be highlighted is that when the court determines a discharge 
application in terms of s 174 of the Act, the credibility of the State’s witnesses play only a 
limited role.286 The court is entitled to disregard the State’s evidence and discharge the accused 
where the evidence is of ‘such poor quality’ that no reasonable man could convict the accused 
on it.287 This is another issue that South African courts fail to understand, and an issue that 
arose again in Dewani. The court was so concerned about the credibility of Tongo’s evidence 
and the detail involved, that the bigger picture had faded. Spotting every discrepancy in 
Tongo’s evidence should not be done when determining a discharge, rather, the court should 
have looked for every link that could have drawn the accused to the conspiracy. Thus, the court 
concerned itself too much with ‘weighing up’ the evidence. In this regard Reddi and Ramji 
submit that: 
‘…this is neither within their remit nor competence at the stage of the close of the State’s 
case’.288 
 
4.7.2 Corroboration  
 
The judge had emphasised that what the State needed to prove in order to avoid the accused 
being discharged was a corroboration of Tongo’s evidence.289 It is ‘common cause that the only 
person who could implicate the accused was Tongo (who was an accomplice witness)’.290 This 
is so as Tongo directly interacted with the accused. 
 
The court in Dewani made reference to the case of S v Gentle291 which states the following 
with regards to corroboration:292 
‘It must be emphasised immediately that by corroboration is meant other evidence which 
supports the evidence of the complainant, and which render the evidence of the accused less 
probable, on the issues in dispute’.293 
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During his testimony, Tongo had discussed and described the various meetings that he had had 
with the accused which concerned the accused’s strategy to kill the deceased. In accordance, 
the State presented certain CCTV footage to corroborate Tongo’s evidence which showed: 
 
a) On Friday, 12 November 2010, Tongo and the accused had met in the parking lot 
outside the Cape Grace Hotel;294 
 
b) On Saturday morning, 13 November 2010, the accused was fetched from the Cape 
Grace Hotel by Tongo;295 
 
c) The accused returning to the Cape Grace Hotel with Tongo later on that Saturday 
morning;296 
 
d) On the evening of Saturday, 13 November 2010, Tongo fetched the accused and the 
deceased from the Cape Grace Hotel;297 
 
e) ‘The accused talking to Tongo after the incident on Sunday, 14 November 2010’;298 
 
f) ‘The accused paying Tongo R1 000,00 in the communications room on Tuesday, 16 
November 2010’.299  
 
In this regard the judge stated that the CCTV footage does: 
‘…not provide any corroboration for the version of Tongo where it differs from that of the 
accused set out in his plea explanation, as none of these events are in issue. It is what was said 
during those events that is in issue and for that there is only the version of Tongo’.300  
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However, despite this compelling evidence, which could tie the accused to the crime, the court 
found that the CCTV footage was not in line with the standard required for corroboration.301 
This is a pure misdirection on the facts on the part of the judge.302 
 
Although the CCTV footage could obviously not confirm what was discussed during the 
meetings between Tongo and the accused, it is unclear on what other grounds it failed to 
corroborate Tongo’s testimony.303 The CCTV footage serves as evidence to prove the 
probability of Tongo’s version of what really occurred. 
 
The judge held the same with regard to the evidence of the telephone conversations. She stated 
that the evidence did not reveal what was said during the conversations but merely reveals that 
the conversations took place between Tongo and the accused.304 Should this not be a cause for 
suspicion in her mind? 
 
Therefore, it is absurd that the court declined to put the accused on his defence merely because 
he was so careful not to expose himself as the mastermind behind the crime.305 It can be argued 
that the CCTV footage and telephone communications amounted to sufficient circumstantial 
evidence to put the accused to his defence.  
 
The testimony delivered by the accomplice witness, Tongo, was indisputably corroborated by 
the CCTV footage and therefore the least the court could have done would be to ask for an 
‘innocent explanation’ from the accused of what had occurred during the conversations 
captured with Tongo.306 It is therefore submitted that discharging the accused under these 
circumstances amounts to a miscarriage of justice. 
 
To add salt to the wounds, the court found that there were components of the State’s evidence 
that implicated the accused.307 The discovery of such implications together with the 
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corroboration of Tongo’s evidence by the CCTV footage was all the court should have 
concerned itself with as it amounted to sufficient evidence at the stage of discharge.308 
 
Therefore, although the court highlighted the rule that the State’s evidence could be ignored if 
it were of such poor quality that no reasonable person could possibly accept it, the court’s 
interpretation of this rule in the analysis of the State’s evidence was incomprehensible.309 Reddi 
and Ramji make the following statement with which the author strongly agrees: 
‘Had the court applied the test correctly, it would have found: (i) evidence existed in this case 
in the form of an accomplice whose evidence, taken at its highest, was not so far-fetched or 
inadequate that a reasonable person would not believe it; (ii) there was corroboration of this 
evidence in terms of the legal requirements; and (iii) the evidence tended to show a conspiracy 
agreement between the accused and Tongo. This is what the State needed to show, perhaps not 
for conviction – but to avoid discharge’.310 
 
However, their conclusion is contrary to what the court actually did. The court conducted a 
thorough enquiry into the facts, evaluated the State’s evidence and subsequently discharged the 
accused.  
 
It is submitted that the approach the court should have taken in deciding whether to discharge 
the accused, is that that was taken by the court in Masondo v S311 where Kgomo J stated that: 
‘The gist of the matter herein is that as opposed to situations where there is no evidence on 
record, in this case there is indeed evidence led against him which, if found to be cogent and 
credible, may amount to a prima facie case against him. I must make it clear that I am not saying 
the accused’s guilt on these two counts have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. I am saying 
the evidence led, when juxtaposed to the forensic evidence and the evidence of pointing out 
which has already been accepted against accused 2 is such that it calls for reply’.312 
 
It is agreed with the prosecution in Dewani that the testimony of the accomplice witness does 
not have to be: 
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‘…wholly consistent and wholly reliable or even wholly truthful – the ultimate test, after 
cautiously considering accomplices’ evidence is whether the court is satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt that in its essential features the story he tells is true’.313 
 
The ‘evidence was not of such poor quality’ that the court could simply ‘draw a proverbial line 
through it’.314 
 
After the judge reached an unsatisfactory conclusion, it was unfortunate that the State could 
not even appeal the matter. The State could only appeal the case on a question of law.315 None 
of the above issues deal with a question of law, but rather questions of fact.   
 
4.8 Conclusion 
 
Though s 174 of the Act is useful in ensuring that the fair trial rights’ of the accused are upheld, 
the Dewani case is a classic example of how the section could result in a miscarriage of justice 
due to the court’s unencumbered discretion in deciding to discharge an accused.  
 
It was also unfortunate that the court in Dewani completely overlooked public opinion in 
reaching its judgment.316 However, it must be borne in the mind of judges that public uproar 
will generally flow from controversial decisions where a wealthy or famous accused is 
involved, as in the case of Dewani. Both the victim and public will have an interest in a matter 
where the State has adduced evidence which requires a reply from the accused.317 Nonetheless, 
the interests of the victim, the public and the accused must be balanced, failing which, ‘there 
is a risk of victim/public dissatisfaction with the process’.318 
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Furthermore, the court in Dewani entirely overlooked the victim’s interests. This was probably 
because the court was so concerned with the credibility of the State’s witnesses’ and the 
accused’s rights. Such a failure may lead the public to perceive that justice is not being served. 
‘The courts need public support and institutional legitimacy to function fairly and 
efficiently’.319 
 
In addition, the court seems to have deviated from the boundaries of the test for discharge and 
concerned itself with issues unnecessary to the discharge stage. Looking at the nature of the 
evidence presented by the State, there is no doubt that it could have been used to connect the 
accused to the conspiracy, but it was ignored in totality due to certain inconsistencies and 
contradictions; aspects of evidence that should not be looked into in such great detail at the 
discharge stage. As a result, an accused who rightly should have been put on his defence has 
been acquitted leaving many South African citizens, as well as, the victim’s family 
disappointed in the South African justice system. 
 
The following chapter will focus on an evaluation of how the South African courts have been 
applying s 174 of the Act and will conclude on whether the provision should remain in South 
African law or be amended. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION: ASSESSING THE CURRENT RELEVANCE OF SECTION 174 OF 
THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The preceding chapters have discussed the legal arguments surrounding the application of s 
174 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, the history of the section, the operation of the 
discharge provision in Canada and, finally, have analysed the most contentious application of 
the section in the case of S v Dewani. 
 
The primary concern of this final chapter is to discuss whether the circumstances surrounding 
s 174 of the Act justify its expulsion from the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, and hence 
from South African criminal procedure. 
 
5.2 The issues surrounding s 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
 
Although s 174 of the Act is indeed a frontline weapon amongst the fair trial rights’ ammunition 
of an accused, it is fraught with difficulties in respect of both its purpose and practice.320  
 
It must be borne in the mind that the test for discharge is whether, on the evidence at the close 
of the prosecution’s case, a reasonable man, acting carefully, might convict.321 This test has 
been acknowledged in various judgments and is by no means in issue. 
 
However, the argument that may be warranted, is that the test for discharge is either applied 
too critically or uncritically, never correctly. Support for part of this finding is contained in 
Gertsch’s argument: 
‘Often unjustly ineffective in its operation, and based in part on a fiction concerning its origins, 
the discharge procedure at the close of the prosecution’s case has suffered from a state of 
neglect in which its superficially simple provisions have been applied rather uncritically by our 
courts, to the detriment of the of the accused’s procedural rights’.322 
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Whilst this might have occurred in the past, the opposite application now occurs, as in the 
Dewani judgment. Judges are too critically applying s 174 of the Act to the detriment of the 
prosecution’s case and ultimately the interests of justice. 
 
Therefore, to succinctly sum up the issues surrounding the application of s 174 of the Act: first, 
is the issue of the accused’s fair trial rights that accompanies the section where the 
prosecution’s case is weak and a discharge application is subsequently refused by the court, 
secondly, there is a need for clarity on the test for discharge, and whether credibility should 
encompass this test, and third, is the issue of the extent of the court’s unrestricted discretionary 
powers when ruling on an application for discharge.323 
 
The result of all these issues leads to s 174 of the Act being applied in an inconsistent manner, 
and thus, negating the very purpose of the section, hence, defeating the ends of justice. 
 
There is no doubt, that if the court dismisses an application for discharge foreseeing that the 
evidence of the defence might supplement and strengthen the prosecution’s case,324 a variety 
of the accused’s fair trial rights will be infringed.325 However, the two-tier test in S v Shuping326 
is no longer in dispute as the second leg of the inquiry327 was declared unconstitutional.328 
 
Among the abovementioned issues, the issue of the credibility of the prosecution’s evidence 
seems to be most daunting, as was recently evident in the Dewani case. South African judges 
appear to have misconstrued their roles at the moment the prosecution closes its case and an 
application for discharge is made and, the stage at which both the prosecution and defence have 
closed their cases at the end of the trial.329 They seem to see it as their duty to thoroughly weigh 
up the evidence against the accused at the discharge stage as they would at the end of the trial 
when both the State and defence have closed their cases. In some instances, it would seem that 
the judges have not grasped that there is an inevitable shift in their roles when examining the 
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prosecution’s evidence at the close of the prosecution’s case and at the end, after the defence 
has closed its case.330  
 
When the prosecution closes its case, the conventional principle that needs to be remembered 
from the case of S v Mpetha,331 is that the court should conduct a very ‘limited probe’ into the 
credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses. However, there could be certain instances where the 
court could totally ignore the State’s evidence and discharge the accused, where the 
prosecution’s evidence was of ‘such poor quality that no reasonable man could possibly accept 
it’.332 In this regard Williamson J held: 
‘This would really only be in the most exceptional case where the credibility of a witness is so 
utterly destroyed that no part of his material evidence can possibly be believed. Before 
credibility can play a role at all it is a very high degree of untrustworthiness that has to be 
shown’.333 
 
All the court should concern itself with at the point of discharge is whether there is any 
evidence, ‘taken at its highest’, on which a reasonable court would convict.334 The court does 
not need to conduct an intensive inquiry into whether the prosecution had proved its case 
beyond a reasonable doubt when assessing the prosecution’s evidence at the discharge stage.335 
This would seem too high a watermark for testing the evidence at this stage of the trial. 
Consequently, the verdict of guilt is reserved for the end of the trial, once the defence has closed 
its case. Accordingly, the writer agrees with Skeen’s remarks that: 
‘Where the uncontradicted evidence for the State is circumstantial and more than one 
reasonable inference may be drawn, then a discharge should not be granted’.336 
 
Furthermore, in Canada, when the court conducts the preliminary inquiry, in terms of s 548(1) 
of the Canadian Criminal Code, to evaluate whether the Crown has provided sufficient 
evidence before committing the matter to trial, the court does not inquire whether the Crown 
has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.337 All that needs to be established for a trial to 
follow is whether, on the evidence, an inference may be drawn that the accused may be 
                                                          
330 Ibid. 
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guilty.338 It is only once the Crown and defence have closed their cases that the accused’s guilt 
or lack thereof can properly be pronounced by weighing up the evidence of both the Crown 
and defence and conducting a thorough inquiry into credibility.339 
 
Had the court in S v Dewani conducted this very restricted inquiry it would have found that 
there was evidence in the form of CCTV and telephone records that provided a sufficient link 
between the accused and the conspiracy in which Anni Dewani was murdered.340 Such 
circumstantial evidence required the court to refuse the application for discharge commensurate 
with Skeen’s remark.341 Therefore, the accused deserved to be put to his defence. However, in 
light of the very limited guidelines the court is given in respect of the application of s 174 of 
the Act, at the end of the day, as a result of the discretion the court is blessed with, the court 
‘may’ do as it pleases. Such discretion may be problematic, and has been. 
 
In addition, it is unfortunate that the ‘s 174 process has no regard for a victim’s rights, and also 
the interest of the public in a full and fair trial being held’.342 This was also evident in the case 
of S v Dewani where the court completely refused to acknowledge the interests of the victim 
or take public opinion into consideration and was very direct about this.343 In this respect Reddi 
and Ramji state: 
‘The suggestion is not that the victim’s interests be taken into account for the purposes of 
assessing guilt or innocence, or even at the stage of an appeal against a conviction. Nor is the 
suggestion that the victim’s rights should trump the entrenched constitutional rights of an 
accused. However, the disregard of a victim’s interest in a full trial and the reduction of public 
interest to mere opinion, without further substantiation, does not do justice to the full scope of 
the criminal justice system’.344 
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Therefore, it is submitted that the victim’s interest should be a factor, inter alia, that is weighed 
up by the court when considering a discharge application. 
 
5.3 The current relevance of s 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
 
In stating all the issues associated with s 174 of the Act, it becomes necessary to then assess 
the provision’s current relevance in South African law.  
 
With the abolishment of the jury system of adjudication in South Africa in 1969,345 the 
discharge procedure has lost its historical relevance which was to ensure that the jury did not 
reach ‘perverse’ decisions.346 In spite of this drastic change in circumstances, it does not 
necessarily mean that the discharge procedure has lost its value too.347 Hence, the crucial 
question that needs to be considered is whether the discharge procedure remains relevant even 
though the jury system has been abolished?348 In answering this question there are various 
factors that need to be taken into account. 
 
The first factor that needs to be considered is that the discharge procedure is efficient and 
resourceful in that, when properly applied, it ‘cuts off the tail of a superfluous process’.349 
Furthermore, it would be a waste of time, pointless and a waste of court resources to commence 
with ‘an obviously hopeless case’350 when, on the evidence, a conviction is unlikely. 
Consequently, a primary feature of s 174 of the Act is to ‘save time and effort, (and) not to 
complicate the court’s task’.351 
 
Viewed from a constitutional perspective, s 174 of the Act protects various fair trial rights that 
are ‘gifted’ to the accused.352 These include the right against self-incrimination,353 in instances 
where the prosecution does not present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case 
against the accused, and the accused’s right to be presumed innocent until found guilty.354 
                                                          
345 The Abolition of Juries Act 34 of 1969. 
346 Hoffmann & Zeffertt op cit (note 42 above) 392. 
347 Reddi and Ramji op cit (note 207 above) 17. 
348 Ibid. 
349 Masondo supra (note 311 above) para 38. 
350 Williams op cit (note 54 above) at 346; S v Naidoo (1966) (1) PH H 104 (W). 
351 A Kruger Hiemstra's Criminal Procedure (2008) 22. 
352 Reddi and Ramji op cit (note 207 above) 18. 
353 Section 35(3)(j) of the Constitution. 
354 Section 35(3)(h) of the Constitution. 
59 
 
Moreover, where a discharge is refused where the prosecution has presented ‘sufficient 
evidence to establish a prima facie case against the accused, such an accused would be at risk 
of conviction if they do not produce satisfactory evidence in rebuttal’.355 In this regard Reddi 
and Ramji state: 
‘A likely upshot is that, in the face of such circumstances, the accused may have to give up 
their right to remain silent. However, the fact that an accused has to make an election is not a 
breach of the right to silence, since if the right were to be so interpreted, this would sound the 
death knell of the very nature of an adversarial criminal justice system’.356  
 
Therefore, from the above it can be concluded that the discharge procedure is still relevant in 
South African law and still has value.357 Its primary function has merely shifted from one that 
ensures the jury does not reach perverse verdicts to one that guarantees that South African trials 
are efficient and upholds the fair trial rights’ of the accused. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
Despite the abolition of the jury system of adjudication, for which the procedure was primarily 
formulated, the discharge procedure still has worth for the various reasons mentioned above. 
 
In conducting research into s 174 of the Act it soon became apparent that it is not the section 
itself that is problematic but, rather, its application is where issues arise as a result of the court’s 
wide discretion when deciding to discharge an accused. The harm or injustice that results from 
s 174 of the Act is as a result of judges, as triers of fact, ‘acting inappropriately’ when 
considering whether to discharge the accused.358  
 
Therefore, it is necessary to highlight the parameters of the test for discharge in terms of s 174 
of the Act to restore its true purpose of eliminating frivolous matters and ensuring the accused’s 
fair trial rights are protected from unwarranted prosecutions. 
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Various scholars have indicated that courts have a constitutional duty to discharge the accused 
if, at the close of the prosecution’s case, the prosecution had not presented sufficient evidence 
to give the accused a case to answer.359 Likewise, under such circumstances, there arises a 
constitutional right for the accused to be discharged. Consequently, as mentioned on many 
occasions, courts are no longer justified in refusing to discharge an accused on the basis that 
the prosecution’s case may be supplemented by the defence’s case, if the defence elects to 
testify.360 Preferably, what is needed is a balance between the State trying to ‘combat crime 
and the right of accused persons to be protected from their own ignorance, from the excessive 
zeal of prosecutors to secure convictions and from executive-minded courts’.361 
 
Whilst this is true, the recent past has seen judges discharging the accused where they are of 
the opinion that the witnesses for the prosecution are dishonest and ‘unreliable’ and, thus, not 
credible.362 Not many scholars have made recommendations on s 174 of the Act on this issue. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, intensive inquiries into the credibility of prosecution 
witnesses are unwarranted at the discharge stage. For this reason, ‘the credibility inquiry must 
therefore be abandoned’.363 The need for this is clearly evidenced by the outcome in the case 
of S v Dewani. The credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses only becomes a matter of 
consideration once the defence has closed its case at the end of the trial. 
 
Moreover, even Canadian jurisprudence dictates that intensive probes into credibility are 
unnecessary, rather, the prosecution’s evidence should be ‘taken at its highest’.364 ‘The 
requirement that the State evidence be taken at its highest, will provide the necessary limited 
space for a court to discard completely unbelievable witness testimony’.365   
 
In order to restore purpose to s 174 of the Act it is recommended that, when faced with a 
decision to discharge an accused, the judge must ask whether the evidence presented by the 
prosecution, taken at its highest, is sufficient to found a conviction. Any circumstantial 
evidence will suffice.366 Secondly, once it is established that there is evidence that could link 
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the accused to the charge, the judge must spare the assessment and weighing up of that evidence 
for the end of the trial, unless the evidence is highly unbelievable.367 If the judge does not do 
this then ‘he places the State in a position where it is required to meet an unduly high, if not 
impossible, burden without the other side testifying’.368 
 
Essentially, what is required of the judge at the application for discharge stage is to thoroughly 
understand and differentiate his role at this stage, from that at the end of the trial. What is 
essential is an appreciation by ‘judges of their shifting functions at different stages of a criminal 
trial’.369 If judges can do this, and exercise their discretion accordingly, it would restore 
meaning to s 174 of the Act and prevent high-profile defence teams from utilising loopholes 
and abusing the justice system. This is what the interests of justice and the outcome of S v 
Dewani require. 
 
In conclusion it is suggested that it is unnecessary for s 174 of the Act be ejected from the 
Criminal Procedure Act. The discharge procedure has value when applied in the manner 
recommended above. In conducting this research it became clear that s 174 of the Act is capable 
of being revived to being purposeful again. However, the same cannot be said for s 548(1) of 
the Canadian Criminal Code which is far more problematic. The preliminary inquiry in Canada 
is elected more for ancillary purposes than the purpose for which the inquiry was created – to 
determine whether there is evidential merit to the Crown’s case before commencing with a 
trial. 
 
With that said, it may be necessary to amend the section so as to ensure a minimal probe into 
credibility and to limit judicial discretion in a sense. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Word Count: 19 139 
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